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THE STRANGE LIFE OF STANLEY V. ILLINOIS: A CASE
STUDY IN PARENT REPRESENTATION AND LAW
REFORM
JOSH GUPTA-KAGAN



ABSTRACT
This Article helps describe the growth of parent representation through an
analysis of Stanley v. Illinois—the foundational Supreme Court case that
established parental fitness as the constitutional lynchpin of any child protection
case. The Article begins with Stanley’s trial court litigation, which illustrates the
importance of vigorous parental representation and an effort by the court to
prevent Stanley from obtaining an attorney. It proceeds to analyze how family
courts applied it (or not) in the years following the Supreme Court’s decision and
what factors have led to a recent resurgence of Stanley’s fitness focus.
Despite Stanley’s requirement that states prove parents unfit before taking
custody of a child, several doctrines permitted states to do precisely that in the
1970s and 1980s. Those doctrines deem a fitness finding regarding one parent
sufficient to deny the other parent custody, even without a hearing on their
fitness. These doctrines were developed without wrestling with Stanley and are
deeply gendered, especially because most non-resident and non-offending
parents are fathers. How the law should address such parents is complicated, but
Stanley ought to be the starting point. In contrast to doctrines ignoring Stanley in
some child protection cases, the case had significant influence in private
adoption law. One factor that explains this contrast is that adoption agencies
were well-represented and had power to insist on legal reforms following
Stanley.
Finally, this Article explores the legal, policy, and academic contexts in
which Stanley was ignored and in which it now enjoys a resurgence. The
Supreme Court decided Stanley at a time when academics did not widely study
the role of unwed fathers, when policy-makers sought to reform the child
protection system largely without reliance on constitutional law, when parents
widely lacked lawyers to advocate for them in family court, and when children’s
lawyers generally sided with state intervention. All four of those contextual
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elements have changed in intervening years, contributing to several recent
important cases featuring a resurgence of Stanley.
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................... 569
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 571
II. STANLEY V. ILLINOIS: A FOUNDATIONAL CHILD PROTECTION CASE ............. 574
A. Factual Background—Stanley as a Child Protection and NonOffending Parent Case .......................................................................... 574
B. “Gee, I’d Like to Acquire an Attorney”: Stanley and the Importance
of Parent Representation ....................................................................... 577
C. A Legal Precedent to Guide All Child Protection Cases ......................... 580
III. NON-OFFENDING PARENTS AND CHILD PROTECTION LAW ......................... 582
A. A Non-Offending Parent Child Protection Case Study ........................... 583
B. Extreme Option 1: Ignore the Father ....................................................... 586
C. Extreme Option 2: Treat the Father as a Hero ......................................... 590
D. Observations on the State of the Law ...................................................... 592
IV. STANLEY’S IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON PRIVATE ADOPTION CASES .................. 594
A. Immediate, Uncritical Application of Stanley in Private Adoption
Cases ..................................................................................................... 595
B. Stanley Triggers Fast Legislative Reforms Regarding Private
Adoptions .............................................................................................. 597
C. Lessons from Stanley’s Application to Private Adoptions ...................... 599
V. MEANWHILE IN NON-OFFENDING PARENT CASES, STANLEY WAS
IGNORED ........................................................................................................ 600
A. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ............................ 601
B. One-Parent Doctrine ................................................................................ 605
C. Explaining Child Protection Cases That Ignored Stanley........................ 610
1. Counsel for Non-Offending Parents ...................................................... 610
2. Counsel for Children ............................................................................. 611
3. Family Court and Child Protection Agency Culture ............................. 612
4. Academics’ and Policy-Makers’ Focus Away from Constitutional
Fitness.................................................................................................. 614
VI. STANLEY’S RECENT RESURGENCE IN CHILD PROTECTION CASES................ 616
A. Concerning Practices Continue ............................................................... 616
1. Litigation Practices and Court Rulings akin to Stanley ....................... 616
2. Inadequate Social Worker Engagement with Non-Custodial
Fathers ............................................................................................... 618
3. Viewing Non-Offending Parents as Saviors ........................................ 619
B. Stanley’s Resurgence ............................................................................... 620

GUPTA-KAGAN_PUBLISHERPROOF_9.10.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

THE STRANGE LIFE OF STANLEY V. ILLINOIS

11/12/2017 10:23 PM

571

C. Explaining Stanley’s Emergent Resurgence—and Ongoing
Challenges ............................................................................................. 621
1. Expanded and Strengthened Parents’ Bar—with Significant
Room for Improvement .................................................................. 622
2. A Children’s Bar Friendlier to Stanley and Parental Rights............. 623
3. Academic Attention.......................................................................... 624
4. Increased Focus on Foster Care’s Harms ......................................... 626
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 628

I.
INTRODUCTION
This symposium celebrates the dramatic and important growth of parent
representation in child protection cases. It recognizes the crucial role that
parents’ attorneys play—both for their clients and for the accurate, fair, and
constitutional operation of the child protection system. This Article helps tell the
story of the growth of parent representation through an analysis of Stanley v.
Illinois1—the foundational Supreme Court case that established parental fitness
as the constitutional lynchpin of any child protection case. This Article describes
Stanley’s litigation, the ways in which family courts2 applied it (or not) in the
years following the Supreme Court’s decision, and a recent resurgence of
Stanley’s application in child protection cases, which coincides with the growth
of parent representation.
In Stanley, the Supreme Court addressed Peter Stanley’s efforts to regain
custody of his children from the Illinois foster care system after the death of his
partner, Joan Stanley, to whom he was not married. Stanley became a canonical
case regarding the rights of unwed fathers, and, crucially for the child protection
field, it included a broader holding that only parental fitness can justify state
action to remove children from their parents’ custody.3 Stanley arose as a child
protection case, pitting the power of the state against a parent whom state
authorities initially alleged to be unfit. The state chose to take a shortcut,
however: rather than actually proving Mr. Stanley’s lack of fitness, it simply
relied on a then-existing state statute rendering all children of an unwed father

1. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2. I use the phrase “family courts” to refer to the state courts with jurisdiction to decide cases
alleging that parents have abused or neglected a child or that a child is otherwise dependent on the
state. Some jurisdictions or scholars use the phrase “juvenile court” instead to refer to the same
courts, and the two phrases are often used interchangeably in the field. I generally use the term
“family court” but use “juvenile court” when referring to a particular jurisdiction whose law uses
that phrase to describe its courts or when quoting other authorities’ use of the phrase.
3. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
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and a deceased mother dependent.4 The Supreme Court declared this shortcut
unconstitutional, requiring the state to prove parents unfit before taking custody
of children.5
Stanley’s trial court litigation illustrates the importance of parent
representation and the ways that family courts historically diminished this role.
Stanley itself would not have become a foundational Supreme Court case had
Peter Stanley not retained a lawyer eager to challenge a juvenile court’s unfair
practices, who worked to ensure he could represent Stanley.6 Stanley nearly had
to represent himself. At a moment when Stanley lacked counsel, the judge asked
him if he was ready to proceed. Stanley insisted on finding an attorney, telling
the judge, “Gee, I would like to acquire an attorney.”7 The judge proceeded
anyway and declared Stanley’s children dependent based on the absence of a
marriage between Stanley and the children’s deceased mother. Stanley soon
returned to court with an attorney, who pressed the appeal to the Supreme
Court.8
Many family courts did not follow Stanley’s requirement that states prove
parents unfit before taking custody of their child in cases with analogous facts.
In the absence of strong parent representation9 in the 1970s and 1980s, several
doctrines developed that permitted state agencies to take children into foster care
or otherwise change custody arrangements without granting parents the hearings
on their fitness that Stanley required. Multiple state courts adopted the “one
parent doctrine,” which permitted states to take custody based only on the
unfitness of one parent—even if the state did not allege or prove the other
4. A “dependent” child is one who is dependent on the state for a home and is, therefore,
subject to a family court’s power to place the child in foster care. The Supreme Court thus
described Stanley’s case as “a dependency proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois.” Id. at
646.
5. Id. at 658.
6. See PATRICK T. MURPHY, OUR KINDLY PARENT—THE STATE 15 (The Viking Press, Inc.
ed., 1974).
7. See discussion infra Part II.B. As explained in Part II.B, Stanley retained an attorney who
moved to withdraw for an apparent conflict of interest. See Transcript of Record at 8, In re Peter
Stanley Jr. and Kimberly Stanley, Nos. 69J004773, 69J004774 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Juv. Div. May 6, 1969)
[hereinafter Stanley Trial Transcript] (on file with author). After the judge proceeded to his ruling
despite Stanley’s request for an attorney, the first attorney, Patrick Murphy, re-entered the case. Id.
at 98–100.
8. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also MURPHY, supra note 6, at 15.
9. One widely-respected explanation of what “strong parental representation” entails can be
found in the American Bar Association’s standards. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR ATTORNEYS
REPRESENTING PARENTS IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/center_on_children_and_the_law/parent
representation/ABA-Parent-Attorney-Standards.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B44V-FM
M6] (including identifying, researching, and arguing viable legal claims in favor of a parent’s
claim to custody consistent with a parent’s wishes). For purposes of this article, strong parent
representation would, when a parent so desired, seek to enforce the parent’s right under Stanley to
custody absent state proof of that parent’s unfitness. The ABA did not adopt its parent
representation standards until 2006—a date that reflects the absence of an effective parent
representation infrastructure in the decades that preceded them.
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parent’s unfitness.10 In addition, a group of state administrators adopted rules
making it difficult for non-offending parents who lived across state lines to
obtain custody of their children.11 These early authorities ignored Stanley. In at
least one state, courts adopted the opposite doctrine with a different but related
problem—giving custody of children immediately to non-offending parents and
closing cases before the parent accused of abuse or neglect had his or her
Stanley-required fitness hearing.12
Those doctrines ignored Stanley in some child protection cases—the types
of cases in which Stanley arose. In contrast, Stanley had significant influence in
private law disputes. Stanley was the first of a series of cases involving unwed
fathers’ rights in the private adoptions of their children and catalyzed several
important statutory reforms in such cases. One factor explaining this contrast
between child protection and private adoption cases is representation. Unlike
parents in child protection cases, adoption agencies were well-represented and
had power to insist on legal reforms following Stanley.
The way in which courts should address child protection cases involving
non-offending parents continues to raise complicated issues. The law remains
inconsistent across states, with many states denying parents fitness hearings.
Moreover, these doctrines are deeply gendered. Non-offending parents are
usually non-custodial, and most non-custodial parents are fathers.13 The oneparent doctrine smacks of stereotypical distrust of unwed fathers, casting them
not as parents entitled to custody of their children unless proven unfit, but as
individuals who should be viewed as dangerous to their children. Resisting that
stereotype, however, risks reinforcing another: fathers as heroes swooping in to
save their children from depraved and unfit mothers, who may also be deprived
of custody without hearings on their fitness. Stanley should be the starting point
for finding a better balance in the law’s approach to these difficult issues.
This Article explores the legal, policy, and academic contexts in which
Stanley was ignored and in which it now enjoys a resurgence. The Supreme
Court decided Stanley at a time when academics did not study the role of unwed
fathers, when policy-makers sought to reform the child protection system largely
heedless of constitutional law, when the children’s bar largely sided with state
intervention, and when parents often lacked lawyers to advocate for them in
family court.14 These four contextual elements have changed, sometimes
radically, in intervening years, contributing to several recent decisions rejecting
the one-parent doctrine and making it easier for out-of-state parents to seek
custody of their children when the children are placed into foster care.15 In

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Parts III.B & V.B.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part VI.B and VI.C.
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contrast to their predecessors, these cases feature explicit discussion of Stanley
and the importance of parental fitness. These cases hopefully will lead to more
nuanced laws governing the relationship between maltreated children, their
parents—both offending and non-offending—and the state.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II revisits the litigation of Stanley
v. Illinois to demonstrate, first, that Stanley is a child protection case with direct
implications for how child protection law treats cases involving non-offending
parents and, second, that Stanley illustrates the importance of parent
representation. Part III explores how child protection law addresses nonoffending parents, often in violation of Stanley. The remaining sections explain
how the law arrived at this place after Stanley. Part IV explains how and why
Stanley significantly influenced private adoption law. Part V explains how child
protection cases involving non-offending parents ignored Stanley and analyzes
why Stanley did not have a stronger immediate impact on those cases. Part VI
describes Stanley’s more recent resurgence in child protection cases and analyzes
why this revival is occurring now.
II.
STANLEY V. ILLINOIS: A FOUNDATIONAL CHILD PROTECTION CASE
Stanley may be best known as a case impacting private adoptions, but its
underlying facts, and the Supreme Court’s framing of those facts, presents it,
first and foremost, as a child protection case about a legally non-offending
parent. Its trial court history also reflects the importance of vigorous parent
representation—both for this case and beyond. Stanley ultimately held that
parents enjoy a substantive due process right to custody of their children and a
procedural right to maintain custody unless the state proves them unfit.
A. Factual Background—Stanley as a Child Protection and Non-Offending
Parent Case
As I have discussed elsewhere,16 Stanley’s factual background reveals that,
like more recent cases discussed in Part III, it arose as a child protection case but
the state litigated it as a non-offending parent case. The case began with state
authorities raising questions about Peter Stanley’s parental fitness—questions
that led to a finding that Stanley had neglected his oldest child. But these same
questions were never definitively answered regarding his two younger children,
because the state chose to litigate Stanley’s marital status rather than his parental
fitness. Avoiding the question of Stanley’s fitness does not appear to have served
any party to the case: it either prevented the state from protecting Stanley’s
children by rendering the trial court judgment suspect (if he was, in fact, unfit to

16. See generally Josh Gupta-Kagan, Stanley v. Illinois’s Untold Story, 24 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 773 (2016).
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raise them) or unnecessarily placed Stanley’s children in foster care (if he was
fit).17
Peter and Joan Stanley lived together in Chicago “intermittently” and had
three children together.18 Peter asserted that Joan was his common law spouse,19
and they used a single family name.20 However, for reasons not established in
the record, Peter and Joan never legally married. Illinois had outlawed commonlaw marriage decades earlier, so their relationship had no recognized legal
status.21 Whatever their reasons for not formalizing their relationship, there was
no doubt about Peter’s paternity of their three children, Karen, Peter Jr., and
Kimberly.22 Peter and Joan raised all three children together.23 Peter Sr. testified
he was their father,24 no party ever challenged his paternity,25 and the state
named him as the father in its petitions.26 Peter, Joan, and the three children
formed a family until Joan’s death on September 20, 1968.27

17. Id. at 774–75.
18. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
19. Stanley’s lawyer, Patrick Murphy, began his oral argument to the United States Supreme
Court by stating, “For eighteen years, Peter Stanley lived with his common-law-wife.” After Chief
Justice Burger forced him to acknowledge that Illinois “outlawed” common-law marriage, Murphy
stated, “I am using it [the phrase “common law marriage”] in the generic sense of the word. He
lived with a woman for eighteen years whom he called his wife.” Oral Argument at 1:14, Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (No. 70-5014), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5014
[https://perma.cc/S6RU-4MN8]. At trial, Peter testified that Joan was his wife. Stanley Trial
Transcript, supra note 7, May 6, 1969, at 19. Stanley first requested a continuance so he could
produce a marriage certificate but never produced one. Id. at 3–4.
20. Patrick Murphy, Peter Stanley’s attorney (now a Judge in the State of Illinois, 5th
Municipal District, Circuit Court of Cook County Domestic Relations Division), could not recall in
a 2014 interview whether Joan was born with the last name Stanley or had changed her name and
said he assumed she took Peter’s name. Interview with Patrick T. Murphy, counsel for Stanley
(Apr. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Murphy Interview] (on file with author).
21. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 663–64 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
22. Peter Jr. was born in 1966 and Kimberly was born in 1968. Karen Stanley was not party
to the case that reached the Supreme Court, so the publicly available court records do not include
her birth date. Testimony indicated that she was at least ten years old. A probation officer testified
that she believed Peter Stanley lived with Joan and the children “for approximately ten years after
she [Joan] had Karen.” Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 7, May 6, 1969, at 17.
23. The probation officer testified that she believed Peter Stanley had lived with Joan Stanley
from Peter Jr. and Kimberly’s birth onwards. Id. at 17–18.
24. Id. at 19.
25. At trial, the state’s attorney said “we are not here attempting to state or stipulate that the
father is not the natural father of these children, just that there is no legal parent surviving, and
therefore, these children are dependent children under the Statute.” Stanley Trial Transcript, supra
note 7, May 6, 1969, at 6. The state of Illinois later argued to the Supreme Court that “in this
record there has been no proof that Peter Stanley in fact is the father of these children” and opened
its argument by describing the children as those “assumed to be his.” Argument of Morton E.
Friedman, Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 35:21.
26. Neglect Petition, In re Peter Stanley Jr., No. 69J004773 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Juv. Div. March 21,
1969) (on file with author).
27. Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 7, May 6, 1969, at 17–19.
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State intervention soon followed. The juvenile court found that Stanley had
neglected Karen and gave custody of her to the state, which placed her in a foster
home.28 Karen Stanley never reunited with her father during her childhood.29
Peter Stanley sent his younger two children to live with friends of his, the
Ness family.30 The state of Illinois then intervened regarding those children as
well, filing a petition on April 1, 1969 alleging that Peter Stanley had neglected
his two youngest children but without specifying how Stanley had done so.31
Rather than prove this unspecified neglect, the state amended its petition to
allege only that the children were dependent, because an Illinois statute did not
recognize unwed fathers as having parental rights.32 On this theory, the court
placed the youngest children in foster care with the Ness family.33
The state’s decision to avoid litigating its unfitness allegation against
Stanley transformed the case. The legal issue became his and Joan Stanley’s
marital status; the case was now about Peter Stanley’s rights as a non-offending
parent objecting to the state child protection system’s intervention in his family.
Whether there was any evidence to support the state’s initial unfitness allegation
cannot be said with certainty—we do not know if whatever facts supported the
adjudication that Peter Stanley had neglected Karen would have also supported a
finding that he neglected his younger children or if other evidence supported the
state’s initial neglect allegation.
We can infer with some confidence, however, that the state’s litigation
decision did not serve the children it sought to protect. The state placed the
children in foster care and shifted them through five foster homes.34Years after
their initial placement in foster care, the state ultimately reunified them with
their father.35 If Peter Stanley was a fit parent, then the state’s decision
28. Id., April 1, 1969, at 2. The case file of Peter Jr. and Kimberly discusses this history
regarding Karen. The two younger children’s cases became the Supreme Court case Stanley v.
Illinois, and only their cases became available for public viewing. The case involving Karen
Stanley remains sealed.
29. Murphy Interview, supra note 20.
30. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 667 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Stanley’s counsel
described his action this way: “He left his children with his long time and trusted friend, the Nesses
and he said, ‘Would you take care of them?’ . . . [It is the] same thing that a wed father might have
done.” Argument of Patrick Murphy, Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 6:30.
31. Neglect Petition, supra note 26.
32. Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 7, Apr. 15, 1969, at 3.
33. Id. at 94.
34. Fredric Soll, Father Has Hopes of Getting Kids Back, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 1972, at §1–3,
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1972/04/04/page/3/article/display-ad-2-no-title [https://perma.
cc/X2S4-WY54].
35. Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the state refiled a petition alleging that Stanley
had neglected his two younger children. The case records remain sealed, but the media reported
that the juvenile court ruled Stanley unfit in September 1973. See Joseph Sjostrom, Unwed Dad
Loses Rights to Children, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1973, at §2–16, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/
1973/09/14/page/36/article/display-ad-33-no-title [https://perma.cc/8UQ8-GA62]. Stanley then
appealed this ruling and, according to his attorney Patrick T. Murphy, the state dismissed the
charges against him and returned his children to him. Letter from Patrick T. Murphy, counsel for
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precipitated a years-long denial of Stanley’s and his children’s right to family
integrity, unnecessarily harming all three individuals for years before they
eventually reunified. If Peter Stanley was, in fact, unfit to raise his two younger
children, then the state’s decision not even to attempt to prove the neglect that it
initially alleged rendered its efforts vulnerable to legal attack. Ultimately, this
legal approach forced the children to live through years of uncertainty in
multiple foster homes, with the state ultimately abandoning its efforts and
leaving two children to live with a questionable father from whom they had been
separated for six years.
B. “Gee, I’d Like to Acquire an Attorney”: Stanley and the Importance of Parent
Representation
The trial court litigation of Stanley v. Illinois36also aptly illustrates the
essential need for zealous parent representation. It shows a disturbing
willingness by the family court to force a parent to proceed without counsel and
an impressive insistence by Stanley that he wanted counsel. Stanley’s ability to
retain a crusading reformer, Patrick Murphy, and Murphy’s ability to stay on the
case despite an apparent conflict of interest, were essential to In re Stanley &
Stanley becoming a landmark Supreme Court case.
Stanley retained Murphy, a self-described activist in charge of Chicago’s
new Juvenile Legal Aid Society. In a 1974 book, Murphy described his firm as
practicing “[Saul] Alinsky law—using a variety of legal actions (some valid,
some spurious), investigations, and intelligent use of the media to try to move,
embarrass, and change bureaucracies.”37 Murphy used these tactics in his effort
to reform both juvenile court and the state agencies that took custody of children
deemed delinquent, dependent, or neglected by the court.38 Murphy did not
specifically try to change the statute discriminating against unwed fathers until
Peter Stanley retained him.39 Murphy soon challenged various aspects of the
statute and the family court’s treatment of Stanley, leading to his ultimately
successful appeal to the Supreme Court. While his lawyering was imperfect, his
vigorous advocacy made it a Supreme Court case.40
The first challenge was whether Murphy could represent Stanley in juvenile
court. Murphy had represented Karen Stanley, Stanley’s oldest daughter, in the
case that found Stanley had neglected her, and this representation presented a
likely conflict of interest. Murphy had prosecuted the case leading to an
Stanley (March 23, 1976), quoted in JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 261 (6th
ed. 2012).
36. During the trial court litigation, the case was captioned In re Stanley & Stanley.
37. MURPHY, supra note 6, at 14.
38. Id. at 12–15.
39. See id. at 14–15 (describing how Murphy and his team identified various issues for
reform and then “happened upon” the state’s treatment of unwed fathers).
40. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 16, at 786–91 (describing litigation choices in Stanley,
particularly the choice to rely entirely on equal protection rather than due process arguments).
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adjudication that Stanley was not fit to parent Karen.41 Murphy was then
retained by Stanley to defend against the state’s allegation that he was not fit.
Murphy, through an associate, Fred Meinfelder, requested the trial court’s leave
to withdraw from representing Stanley due to this conflict, and the court readily
granted that leave.42
This withdrawal left Stanley without a lawyer, facing a legal action that
could deprive him of the legal custody of his two youngest children. The
transcript reveals an exchange between Stanley, who insisted on finding a
lawyer, and a judge, who appeared eager to move his docket and saw little
importance in Stanley having his own attorney, either as a means to challenge
the court’s likely order against him or to further Stanley’s sense of procedural
justice:
The Court: Sir, you don’t have an attorney at this point. The
State is going to proceed and ask the Court to enter a finding of
dependency, based on the fact that these children have no legal
parent at this time. Are you ready for such a hearing?
Stanley: Is this the attorney? (Indicating Mr. Meinfelder)
The Court: No, he has just withdrawn.
Stanley: No, who is this attorney? [Indicating the guardian ad
litem]
Attorney Kuzel: I am here for the children, sir.
The Court: Mr. Kuzel represents the children. Are you ready for
that hearing? At the last hearing, it was a case of producing a
marriage license and, apparently, that has not been done. Do you
see any other point in obtaining an attorney to investigate any
other aspect of this case?
Apparently from the last hearing, the court recalls that the only
point of issue of whether or not you had a marriage license,
which has not been produced.
What do you wish to do, sir, proceed with the hearing or what?
Stanley: Gee, I would like to acquire an attorney.
The Court: Well, we are going to proceed to take evidence now
and possibly enter some finding which may be vacated if the
father comes in with an attorney and presents argument which
prevents the court otherwise.43

41. Oral Argument at 22:15, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (No. 70-5014),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5014 [https://perma.cc/4LS5-GGEY] (“I was the attorney
who prosecuted the case.”).
42. Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 7, May 6, 1969, at 3–6.
43. Id. at 7–8.
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After the judge forced Stanley to try his case without counsel, Meinfelder
and Murphy reevaluated their withdrawal. Meinfelder had remained in the
courtroom and appeared concerned by the judge’s treatment of Stanley.
Meinfelder asked to approach the bench to “determine whether Mr. Stanley can
come back,” and the judge cut him off, asking if he approached “[a]s a friend of
the Court.”44 Meinfelder answered affirmatively45 and proceeded, essentially, to
litigate the case on behalf of Stanley, conducting a cross-examination of the
state’s witness and a direct examination of Stanley and making a brief closing
statement.46 The court ruled for the state—finding Stanley’s children dependent
and shifting custody away from him.47 Within a week, Murphy had filed a
motion to vacate that order, and the hearing on that motion focused on whether
Murphy could re-enter the case and represent Stanley.
Murphy’s argument for re-entering the case rested significantly on the
importance of parent representation. Murphy first argued that he did not believe
there was on ongoing conflict of interest between his former client, Karen
Stanley, and his new client, Peter Stanley,48 but moved quickly onto the practical
reality that Stanley had no other viable option for obtaining representation:
I might further add, if, in fact, Peter Stanley is to be given his
right to appeal, we’re the only people to appeal. He is not
indigent enough to have [the] Public Defender, not wealthy
enough to have a lawyer. We’ll take this case on for nothing,
whereas, [the] Public Defender cannot do that. So, what you do
if you cannot allow us [to re-enter] as a friend of the Court, then,
you are den[y]ing him [his] right to appeal.49
The parties’ discussion of Stanley’s desire to appeal underscores the
importance of each party having his or her own representative. The state’s
attorney—who, of course, did not represent Stanley and who was directly
adverse to him—attempted to cast doubt on Stanley’s true wishes:
If I could, Your Honor, Mr. Stanley is not here. We don’t know
that he does have a definite desire to appeal this matter. As of the
last hearing he seemed quite satisfied . . . since we left the child
in the home that he chose. . . . Mr. Stanley raised no objection, at
that time, and he has indicated not, at that time or since then, to
me or any other person of the Court that I know of that he wishes
to r[a]ise an appeal.50
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 17–22.
47. Id. at 22. The court then appointed the Nesses as Stanley’s children’s legal guardians,
shifting custody from Stanley to the Nesses.
48. Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 7, May 16, 1969, at 2–6.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. at 7.
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Murphy noted that Stanley was not “quite satisfied” with the prior hearing.
In fact, Mr. Stanley had called and asked Murphy to represent him in an appeal
and the court quickly accepted that representation.51
The court granted leave for Murphy to re-enter the case and represent
Stanley.52 The court accepted Murphy’s argument that he had not previously
represented the two younger children who were involved in the current case.53
The court did not remark explicitly on the importance of Stanley having an
attorney but the court’s ruling, permitting Meinfelder to advocate for Stanley as
a friend of the court and allowing Murphy to re-enter so he could pursue an
appeal, may have reflected a belief in the importance of parent representation.
Thus, a central issue at the trial court stage—taking up about as much
attention as the issue ultimately litigated to the Supreme Court—was the
importance of parent representation. Peter Stanley deserves credit for pushing
this issue—seeking out his own counsel and standing up to the juvenile court
judge with his simple statement, “Gee, I’d like to acquire an attorney.” While an
ongoing conflict of interest may have existed as a result of Patrick Murphy’s
prior representation of Karen Stanley and his later representation of Peter
Stanley,54 Murphy’s commitment both to Peter Stanley and to providing zealous
parent representation in this case were essential to Stanley v. Illinois becoming a
landmark Supreme Court case.
C. A Legal Precedent to Guide All Child Protection Cases
In the Supreme Court of the United States, Stanley earned its place as “one
of the leading cases on parents’ rights in the Court’s history,” giving powerful
support to parents who oppose state efforts to place their children in foster
care.55 Stanley rooted these parental rights in the Due Process Clause and formed
the foundation of all the later due process cases addressing child protection
law.56
Stanley established that parents presumptively have the right to custody of
their children, that this right is of fundamental importance, and that the state
must prove parental unfitness if it seeks to take custody away from a parent. The
51. Id. at 7–9. One is hard-pressed to imagine a prosecutor questioning a defense lawyer’s
assertion that a defendant wished to appeal a conviction, or a plaintiff’s attorney questioning
whether an insurance company’s lawyer wished to raise a particular point in a tort suit. That the
state’s attorney felt he could question what an adverse party truly wanted indicates just how little
power parents had.
52. Id. at 10.
53. Id. at 8–9.
54. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 16, at 785 & n.90.
55. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 64–65 (2005).
56. For a discussion on how Stanley shaped the Supreme Court’s parents’ rights
jurisprudence, see Gupta-Kagan, supra note 16, at 824–26. This influence depended in large part
on the Court deciding the case on due process grounds, in addition to the equal protection grounds
argued by the parties. For the story of how the Court came to its due process holding, see id. at
786–810, 820–24.
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Court concluded that “as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him.”57
Stanley thus formed the basis for the argument that state agencies must prove
each parent unfit before placing a child in foster care. Otherwise, “the State
registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the
custody of fit parents.”58
Stanley also included an equal protection holding. The Court held that
because all parents “are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness
before their children are removed from their custody. . . . [D]enying such a
hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is
inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.”59 This equal protection
holding addressed explicit sex discrimination—the Court noted that Illinois
provided unmarried mothers with a fitness hearing but not unmarried fathers.60
Stanley also foreshadowed two issues that can be particularly difficult in
child protection cases—determining which non-custodial and unwed fathers
have constitutional rights and determining whether non-custodial parents have
the same due process rights as custodial parents. Stanley noted that it addressed a
father who “sired and raised” his children and held that such fathers have due
process rights to custody.61 Later, private adoption cases distinguished between
fathers who can and cannot claim such rights. These cases culminated in Lehr v.
Robertson’s holding that unwed and non-custodial fathers have an opportunity to
develop a legally-protected relationship with their children and that those unwed
fathers who “grasp[] that opportunity” have due process rights.62 Considering
the holdings of Stanley and Lehr together, any father who has grasped his
opportunity in his child appears to have a constitutional right to a fitness hearing
before the state can take custody of that child. This includes parents who did not
exercise primary custody. In Stanley, the Supreme Court majority noted that
Stanley lived with his children and their mother “intermittently,”63 and the
dissent pointed out that, at the time the state intervened, he had left his children
with another family.64 Since Stanley itself applied to a father who did not
exercise full custody rights and did not have physical custody at the time of state

57. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
58. Id. at 652.
59. Id. at 658.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 651; see also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 55, at 65 (noting that Stanley did not
clarify if all biological fathers or only those who had raised their children had constitutional
rights). This issue continues to the present day. Stanley led to the Court’s rule in Lehr v. Robertson
that unwed fathers have an opportunity interest in their children, but can lose constitutional rights
if they fail to act on that interest. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
62. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
63. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
64. Id. at 667.
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intervention, Stanley should similarly apply to fathers who have had primary
custody.65
III.
NON-OFFENDING PARENTS AND CHILD PROTECTION LAW
Stanley recognized a constitutional liberty interest in parent-child
relationships and required family courts to make a finding of parental unfitness
before infringing on that liberty interest. But family courts historically have not
applied Stanley uniformly in child protection cases involving non-offending
parents. In particular, family courts deny custody to non-offending parents
without the state proving them unfit66 or, at the opposite extreme, transfer
custody from an allegedly unfit parent to a non-offending parent without a trial
on the unfitness allegations against the first parent.67 Because such cases involve
a variety of fact patterns and inconsistent responses from one jurisdiction to
another, this Part will outline this issue and states’ responses to it, while Parts V
and VI will discuss how Stanley was and was not applied in the years
immediately following the Supreme Court’s ruling and more recently.
Consider this simplified fact pattern: a child’s primary custodian abuses her,
state child welfare authorities file a petition in family court seeking custody of
the child, and a judge temporarily places the child in foster care. The child’s
other parent lives apart from the abusive parent, has shared custody of the child,
and bears no responsibility for the other parent’s abuse. That non-offending
parent seeks custody of the child. Is the non-offending parent entitled to custody
of the child? Is the child entitled to live with her non-offending parent rather than
with strangers in foster care? Must that parent first prove his or her fitness, or
must the state prove that parent unfit if it wishes to keep custody of the child? If
that parent obtains temporary custody, how should a family court adjudicate
permanent custody? Should it grant the non-offending parent custody quickly
and close the child protection case, or should the court keep that case open, with
orders for rehabilitative services to the abusive, primary custodial parent, and
delay a permanent custody decision until it knows more facts?

65. Courts addressing the rights of non-custodial parents in other contexts have split.
Compare Burke v. Cty. of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying same parental
right to parents with legal but not physical custody), with Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (holding that a non-custodial parent lacked authority to assert his
child’s First Amendment Rights at school). David Meyer has surveyed a range of cases in which
non-custodial parents have lost constitutional claims. David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights
of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1461, 1473–83 (2006). These cases, however,
largely deal with disputes between custodial and non-custodial parents or cases like Newdow, in
which the custodial parent’s authority diminishes non-custodial parent’s right to speak on behalf of
the child. Burke exemplifies a fact pattern more relevant to this article—a dispute between a noncustodial parent and the state where the state also seeks (and has some grounds to seek) to
intervene in the custodial parent’s rights, leaving the non-custodial parent as the sole fit parent.
66. See infra Part III.B.
67. See infra Part III.C.
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There is significant variation in how courts handle such cases. Extreme
approaches remain common, and these approaches fail to follow Stanley’s basic
instruction to focus on parental fitness. At one extreme, some doctrines treat
non-offending parents as if they have few if any rights to their own children. On
this extreme, one parent’s abuse or neglect justifies state custody of the child
over the objection of the other parent, whose fitness is considered irrelevant. At
the other extreme, a court immediately grants the non-offending parent custody
and then closes the case, even without the allegedly unfit parent getting a hearing
on the state’s allegations against her. More moderate positions exist as well, but
these extremes continue to play out with frequency.
Like much else in the child protection system, this issue is highly gendered.
A large majority of foster children are removed from single-parent homes, and a
vast majority of these children live in female-headed households.68 So the
abusive parent in this basic fact pattern is usually the mother, and the nonresident and non-offending parent is usually the father. There are, of course,
many non-custodial mothers,69 but the issue of non-offending, non-custodial
parents seeking custody during child welfare proceedings most frequently arises
when fathers seek custody. Both legal and social work publications routinely
address the issue in gendered terms, focusing on non-resident fathers, not on
non-offending parents.70 The child protection system’s attitude towards such
non-offending fathers (and towards offending mothers) is thus essential to
understanding the issue. Extreme approaches to the issue reflect problematic
gendered stereotypes. The first extreme—that of denying non-offending parents’
custody regardless of their fitness—reflects negative stereotypes of deadbeat,
absentee, and abusive fathers. The second extreme treats fathers as heroes,
saving their children from bad mothers.
A. A Non-Offending Parent Child Protection Case Study
A case study, from a case that I worked on while teaching in the
Washington University School of Law’s Civil Justice Clinic, illustrates both
68. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Involving Nonresident Fathers in Dependency Cases: New
Efforts, New Problems, New Solutions, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 281, 283–84 (2007) (reporting that
more than half and as high as 80% of foster children come from single parent, female-headed
households); WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERV., RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY
ADVISORY COMM., RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN WASHINGTON STATE, SECOND EDITION
COMMITTEE REPORT 6 (2008) (reporting that large majorities of foster children in Washington State
lived in single-parent homes in 2000); Meyer, supra note 65, at 1463 (“[N]on-custodial parents are
overwhelmingly men . . . .”).
69. E.g., David Pate, Jr., African American Fathers and Their Involvement in the Child
Welfare System, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES,
POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 635, 637 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds. 2005).
70. E.g., ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW & NAT’L QUALITY IMPROVEMENT CTR. ON NONRESIDENT FATHERS & THE CHILD WELFARE SYS., ADVOCATING FOR NONRESIDENT FATHERS IN
CHILD WELFARE COURT CASES (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHAT ABOUT
THE DADS?: CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES’ EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY, LOCATE AND INVOLVE
NONRESIDENT FATHERS 39 (2006) [hereinafter WHAT ABOUT THE DADS?].
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doctrinal difficulties and family courts’ instinctive distrust of unwed fathers.71
The court appointed our clinic to represent Andrew, a six-week-old infant.72
Andrew had been born prematurely to his mother, who had used heroin for
several years, including while pregnant with Andrew. After spending his first
month in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), he was finally ready for
discharge, but his mother had continued to use heroin. The local child protective
services (CPS) agency did not believe she could safely have custody and,
therefore, requested court intervention.
The petition named Andrew’s father, Charles Grant, and included only his
name, address, phone number, and date of birth. The date of birth stood out—
Mr. Grant was 58, 30 years older than Andrew’s mother, with whom he did not
live. The petition’s sparse facts showed that Mr. Grant was an older man who
had a sexual relationship with a much younger woman who had a serious drug
problem. The implication, intentional or not, was clear: he was not father
material. No facts related to his parenting warranted inclusion, other than one
fact, which triggered a host of negative stereotypes. The students ran a
background check on Mr. Grant and discovered that he had been convicted of a
homicide in the 1970s and served more than a decade in prison—not exactly a
helpful fact.
The student attorneys initially focused on Andrew’s mother. They obtained
Andrew’s complete hospital records, in hopes of finding records of her
involvement in her son’s life since his birth. Instead, they found a surprise: Mr.
Grant had visited Andrew every day since his birth. The hospital social worker
described Mr. Grant in glowing terms—always loving and appropriate in his
interactions with Andrew and never any indication that he had any substance
abuse problem or any other problem that would interfere with his parenting. In
contrast, Andrew’s mother was discharged from the hospital and had not visited
her son in the NICU since. Various individuals had offered Andrew’s mother the
opportunity to enter drug treatment, but she declined.
The students prepared for the initial hearing, in which they planned to seek
immediate release of Andrew to Mr. Grant. They were optimistic for a positive
result. After all, Mr. Grant had plainly taken on an active role in Andrew’s life,
and the hospital notes provided evidence of his fitness. The state did not allege
that he was an unfit parent or offer evidence of parental unfitness. Mr. Grant’s
paternity had not been established, but he stated his willingness to sign an
acknowledgement of paternity at the initial hearing. However, the judge was

71. I have changed names and other identifying details. Much credit for this case goes to the
students involved and also to Professor Annette Appell, who directs the Civil Justice Clinic and
primarily supervised this case (I assisted and also handled the case during the summer).
72. Our Clinic took appointments to represent both children and parents in child protection
cases. Under Missouri law, we were charged with representing Andrew’s best interests as his
guardian ad litem (GAL). We quickly determined that living in his father’s custody served his best
interests.
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clear—she would not risk Andrew’s safety with his father and did not want to
establish paternity at the initial hearing.
The state then made a perfunctory request for a finding of reasonable efforts
to prevent removal of Andrew from his mother. The state argued that its efforts
to enroll Andrew’s mother in treatment amounted to reasonable efforts to
prevent Andrew’s foster care placement. The students objected. They argued that
the state did nothing for more than one month to confirm Mr. Grant’s paternity,
which would not have taken much effort, or permit Andrew to go home to his
father, even though he was a regular and positive presence. The judge brushed us
off and found that the agency had made reasonable efforts.73 She also ordered
the agency to conduct a DNA test as soon as possible to determine Mr. Grant’s
paternity.
As soon as possible took nearly two months. In the meantime, Mr. Grant
visited Andrew as much as the CPS agency permitted. When the DNA test
finally confirmed his paternity, we suggested that Mr. Grant’s attorney move to
place Andrew in his client’s custody. That lawyer then filed a one-paragraph,
handwritten motion seeking to transfer custody to his client based on the DNA
test. We—as Andrew’s guardian ad litem (GAL)—filed a long memorandum in
support of that motion. We documented Mr. Grant’s ability to take care of his
son—the crib and other baby gear he had, his plans for medical care and child
care, his experience with his adult children, and the availability of those adult
children to assist with their newborn sibling. We acknowledged his criminal
history (which all parties knew) but explained that he had served his time. He
had been a productive citizen who avoided further criminal justice system
involvement since his release in the late 1980s—a longer period of time than
many parents with custody had been alive. We argued that the Missouri statute
permitted, if not required, that custody be granted to Mr. Grant74 and that, if the
judge concluded otherwise, such a ruling would create a serious constitutional
question about Mr. Grant’s rights.75
Prior to the motion, the local CPS agency had resisted Mr. Grant’s efforts.
The foster parents had begun talking about adopting Andrew. After reading the
motion and our memorandum, the agency made no argument against the
motion—but neither would the agency agree with it.
73. Leslie Joan Harris has surveyed state statutes and case law regarding delayed paternity
establishment and found varying rules in different states. Some fault fathers who do not establish
paternity, while others excuse fathers’ delays. Harris, supra note 68, at 294–96. The better
approach is for state agencies to do what we advocated for in the Grant case: “[t]hey should
determine legal paternity promptly.” Id. at 297.
74. Missouri has enacted a statute governing when juvenile courts must release children to
non-offending parents. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.037 (2016).
75. Our strategy of arguing both that Mr. Grant could take care of Andrew well and that he
had the legal right to custody of Andrew illustrates the “dual strategy” recommended by parents’
attorneys. Darice Good-Dworak & Diana Rugh Johnson, The Adjudicatory Hearing, in
REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES: ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAMILY
DEFENDERS 153, 207 (Martin Guggenheim & Vivek S. Sankaran eds. 2015).
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After a hearing, the judge granted the motion and sent Andrew home to live
with his father. The judge ruled that the Missouri statute mandated this result.
Several months later, after it was clear that Mr. Grant was taking good care of
his son, (and when Andrew’s mother had not documented progress in her
struggle with substance abuse) the court granted Mr. Grant full custody and
closed his child protection case.
This custody order came with benefits and costs for Andrew’s mother.
Closing the case may have served her interests by shielding her from courtsanctioned government oversight of her ongoing battles with substance abuse,
while preserving a later opportunity to seek a modification of the order granting
custody to Mr. Grant. But closing the case imposed a cost on her. If Andrew
remained in foster care, she would have had more time to avail herself of
services and to seek reunification with the help of her court-appointed lawyer.
Soon after this hearing, I told the judge, and others whom I had gotten to
know in St. Louis, about my impending move to the University of South
Carolina. The judge who heard Andrew and Mr. Grant’s case politely wished me
well, then paused, mentioned that case, and said, “You know, it’s good to be
proven wrong from time to time.”
Several important truths are embedded in the judge’s statement. First, he
implicitly conceded his skepticism towards Mr. Grant—even in the absence of
any negative evidence about his parenting abilities. Rather than insisting that the
state prove Mr. Grant unfit, he put the burden on Mr. Grant to prove his own
fitness. Second, it took some significant work to prove the judge’s initial
instincts wrong, and it was Andrew’s GALs, not Mr. Grant’s lawyer, who did
that work. GALs and even children’s attorneys in other jurisdictions (or even
others in the same courthouse) may not have taken the same position.76 The
absence of strong advocacy from Mr. Grant’s own lawyer illustrates the ongoing
challenge of protecting family integrity—without vigorous advocacy, there was
little likelihood that this case would have ended as it did.
Elements of the Grant case reflect two extreme options applied in many
states and offer insights into the current state of the law and practice regarding
non-offending parents. This section will explain those options and then offer
some reflections on the state of the law.
B. Extreme Option 1: Ignore the Father
“Low-income noncustodial fathers are often stereotyped as irresponsible
absentee parents who must be legally compelled to fulfill their obligations.”77
Non-custodial fathers of foster children may especially be seen as deadbeats to
be avoided or feared. If that were true, one would expect child protection
agencies to avoid engaging them or to impose multiple prerequisites to such

76. See infra Part V.C.2.
77. Pate, supra note 69, at 641.
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fathers obtaining custody. Indeed, some research has suggested that precisely
such activities take place.78 The Grant case provides one example—a fit father
was ignored by the child protection agency and initially brushed off by a family
court judge.
Two frequently applied legal doctrines have effectively justified such an
approach: the one-parent doctrine and the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children. These two doctrines treat non-offending parents as suspect,
permitting state authorities to maintain custody of children over non-offending
parents’ objection unless that parent can prove their fitness to the court and, in
one category of cases, agency staff.
The one-parent doctrine implicitly operated at the beginning of the Grants’
case. Stanley held that the Due Process Clause entitles parents to custody of their
children unless and until the state can prove them unfit. Mr. Grant was plainly
involved in his son’s life and had sought to establish his paternity, and the state
made no allegations that Mr. Grant was unfit to raise his son. Nevertheless, the
state never even considered him as a caretaker for his son or made any effort to
help establish paternity, while his son stayed in the hospital. This reliance on the
mother’s fitness alone is an example of the one-parent doctrine at work. This
doctrine provides that one parent’s maltreatment suffices for the state to take
custody of the child, thus rendering parents like Mr. Grant legally irrelevant.79
If Mr. Grant lived across the Mississippi River in East St. Louis, Illinois,
then the second doctrine—the application of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children (ICPC) to parents—would have further delayed if not
prevented Mr. Grant from obtaining custody. Under that doctrine, before a foster
care agency sends a child from one state to another for a foster or adoptive
placement, child welfare authorities in the second state must find that the
placement will serve the child’s interests.80 That policy is reasonable for foster
and adoptive placements but not for non-offending parents. Parents, under
Stanley, should have presumptive rights to custody, and any determination of
their rights should focus on their fitness. Yet the Compact flips those Stanleybased rules, denying parents custody and imposing a standard of best interests of
the child rather than fitness of the parent.
In practice, both the one-parent doctrine and application of the Interstate
Compact to parents is highly gendered. Gender’s role in child protection cases
has long been recognized; juvenile and family courts “developed as ‘motherblaming’ institutions where fathers are absent and larger social forces are
virtually invisible.”81 As noted above, mothers far more frequently serve as
primary caretakers. As a result, state child protection agencies more frequently

78. See infra Part VI.A.2.
79. See infra Part V.B.
80. See infra Part V.A.
81. Bernadine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins,
2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 4–5 (1995).
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bring allegations of unfitness against mothers, and the non-offending parents at
issue are overwhelmingly fathers.82
Doctrines that deny non-offending parents custody even without a fitness
hearing reinforce negative stereotypes of fathers as “absent” and untrustworthy.
They are not parents entitled to custody or decision-making power absent proof
of unfitness. Rather, they are men to be skeptical of—potential deadbeat dads
with inherently suspect childrearing skills.
This distrust can exist whether or not fathers comply with gender norms. In
re LaShonda B., an early one-parent doctrine case discussed in Part V.B,
involved a father who fulfilled the stereotypical breadwinner role by doing what
he could to earn a living and provide for his child, while depending on family
members to provide much of the day-to-day care. He traveled frequently for
work and stayed with relatives when work permitted. The court described this
arrangement as “clearly” inadequate.83 That conclusion suggests that even men
who comply with expected gender roles—at least, lower-income men who do so
without earning enough money for a more stable lifestyle—do not benefit from
the parental rights established in Stanley. This result is particularly ironic given
that the law has historically seen breadwinning as a father’s “preeminent” role.84
In other states, unwed fathers’ rights can come down to whether they fulfill
a breadwinner role, at least as the state defines it, consistent with the law’s
historic emphasis on fathers’ breadwinning over all other roles.85 If an unwed
father of a New York foster child wishes to exercise his due process protections
by having a trial on the termination of his parental rights—requiring the state
prove him unfit by clear and convincing evidence before terminating his rights—
then he must prove that he has paid “a fair and reasonable” amount of child
support,86 especially in the months “immediately preceding the filing of the
adoption petition.”87 That child support, however, goes directly to the state,
because, in foster care cases, the state has custody of a child in the time leading
up to filing a termination of parental rights case. Mothers and married fathers do

82. Supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
83. In re LaShonda B., 157 Cal. Rptr. 280, 284 (Ct. App. 1979).
84. See Laurie S. Kohn, Money Can’t Buy You Love: Valuing Contributions by
Nonresidential Fathers, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 57 (2016) (“The legal system’s current valuation of
the paternal breadwinning role as preeminent to any other parental function—particularly a father’s
role as caregiver—has deep roots in social norms, traditional family law doctrine, and practical
concerns about child well-being and the role of the state.”).
85. See id. at 53 (noting that the legal system prioritizes paternal financial contributions
above other forms of caretaking).
86. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(d)(i) (McKinney 2016).
87. In re Adoption of Adreona C., 914 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (App. Div. 2010). One
commentator has noted that New York “[c]ourts have noted that the most relevant time frame for
consideration when determining consent fatherhood is the six months preceding the filing of an
adoption or termination petition.” Amanda Sen, Measuring Fatherhood: “Consent Fathers” and
Discrimination in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1570, 1582
(2012).
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not face the same obligation to prove child support.88 This rule can deny parental
rights to fathers based on their perceived failure to meet stereotypical male
breadwinning obligations, even when these fathers were significantly involved in
their children’s lives in other ways.89
Fathers who defy expected gender roles and seek to be primary caregivers—
not breadwinners—also face stiff challenges. In one telling case involving the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, discussed in Part V.A, a father
spent significant caretaking time with his daughter before the child protection
agency removed her due to the mother’s neglect without making any allegations
against the father. Citing the Interstate Compact, the child protection agency and
the family court denied the father custody for one month and limited the father’s
contact to supervised visits but gave custody to female extended family
members.90 In another Compact case, a social worker’s conclusion that paternal
custody was not in a child’s best interest applied “darned if he does, darned if he
doesn’t” logic. The case worker was concerned both that the father “did not have
a steady income” and that he “was attending school in the evenings and would
not be able to parent the child should he become gainfully employed.”91 That is,
the case worker faulted him for not currently fulfilling his gender-specific duty
to provide for his child and for trying to obtain more education to be a better
provider. In yet another case, a non-offending out-of-state father sought custody
of his son, whose mother had neglected him and voluntarily relinquished
custody. An appellate court upheld termination of the father’s rights, raising
concerns that the father was “responsible for the care of five small, active
children, one of whom has problems similar to those of Warren [which included
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder].”92 The court did not see these
responsibilities as a sign of the father’s experience or fitness to raise his son but
instead concluded that his son’s special needs would overwhelm him. 93
88. Sen, supra note 87, at 1580–82. For an argument that this requirement violates the U.S.
Constitution, see id. at 1592–97.
89. Sen describes one father subject to this rule who lived with the child for the first few
months of her life and subsequently paid support to the child’s mother (but not the state) and
visited the child regularly. Id. at 1571–72.
90. Amended Complaint at 8–9, Adgerson v. District of Columbia, No. 1:11-cv-01772-RLW
(D.D.C. June 19, 2012). The family court eventually closed the case, allowing the father to obtain
custody. He later sued, alleging that the agency’s refusal to give him custody of his daughter
violated his and his daughter’s rights. Id. at 9. The agency and the father settled the case. Order,
Adgerson v. District of Columbia, Case 1:11-cv-01772-RLW (D.D.C. June 19, 2012). The author
was one of Adgerson’s attorneys in this case.
91. In re D.F.–M., 236 P.3d 961, 963 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). The father eventually obtained
custody, but the court did not disapprove of the case worker’s concerns about his employment or
education.
92. Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Mass. 1998).
93. This finding was exacerbated by the procedural problems inherent in applying the
Compact. A New York foster care agency would not approve placing the child, then in a
Massachusetts foster home, in part because it concluded the father did not have the ability to
“fully” understand and care for his son given his son’s special needs. Id. at 1023–24. Details
supporting this conclusion are not included in the opinion, and the trial and appellate courts
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C. Extreme Option 2: Treat the Father as a Hero
Most of the sparse legal commentary that exists criticizes treatment of nonoffending fathers for reasons similar to those articulated in Part III.A. 94 But
another prevalent practice illustrates the opposite extreme: when a father appears
and seeks custody, many states will treat him as the white knight saving the child
from both an unfit mother and a troubled foster care system. These states will
transfer custody to the father and then close the child protection case, even if the
family court never adjudicates the unfitness allegation against the mother.
For this approach, a leading case is In re M.L., in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that, when a non-offending parent (in that case the father)
wishes to raise the child, the child does not satisfy the statutory definition of a
neglected child, which requires a child to have no available and fit parent.95
Although superficially logical, this holding raises serious due process concerns,
discussed in the dissent.96 Holding that the child could never be deemed
neglected meant the petition would be dismissed and the case closed. There
would be no adjudication of the state’s neglect allegations against the mother
and, as a result, the mother lost custody of her child through state action without
her Stanley-required fitness hearing. If the mother—this child’s primary
caretaker—had neglected the child, this decision would absolve the child
protection agency of responsibility to provide reunification and rehabilitative
services to that parent. The family court and the child protection agency would
simply wipe its hands of the case, infringe on the mother’s rights, and eliminate
whatever benefits might come to the child and mother through rehabilitative
services. Other states have similar rules to Pennsylvania’s In re M.L. rule.
Kansas, for instance, gives non-custodial parents the right to custody absent
proof of unfitness and does not require trial courts to evaluate whether to pursue
reunification with formerly custodial parents before transferring custody to the
other parent.97
suggested any such facts would not require close scrutiny because the Compact required New
York’s assent. Id. at 1023 n.2, 1025. The appellate court concluded that the Massachusetts foster
care agency had no obligation to help the father understand and address his son’s needs because
assent from New York was lacking. Id. at 1025.
94. E.g., Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s
Disregard for the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55 (2009);
Angela Greene, The Crab Fisherman and His Children: A Constitutional Compass for the NonOffending Parent in Child Protection Cases, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 173 (2007).
95. In re M.L.,757 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. 2000); see also Harris, supra note 68, at 300–01. In re
M.L. addressed the conflict between two earlier Pennsylvania opinions. 757 A.2d at 850. In re
Justin S. had held, as In re M.L. later did, that a court could change custody of a child without
making a dependency determination. 543 A.2d 1192, 1201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). In contrast, In re
Barclay affirmed a change of custody to a non-offending parent following the entry of a
dependency order—suggesting that the existence of a non-offending parent did not eliminate the
court’s jurisdiction. 468 A.2d 778, 783 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). Neither In re Justin S. nor In re
Barclay cited or discussed Stanley.
96. In re M.L., 757 A.2d at 854–58 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
97. In re T.S., 74 P.3d 1009, 1017–18 (Kan. 2003).
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A similar dynamic occurred in the Grant case. Although Andrew’s mother
conceded early in the case that she had neglected her son, she was still statutorily
entitled to rehabilitation services to help her become and stay sober to raise her
son. By closing the case and granting permanent custody to Mr. Grant, such
services came to an abrupt halt, and Andrew’s mother lost her court-appointed
counsel.
Tactically, some parents and their counsel might be attracted to the In re
M.L. approach. They might be skeptical of rehabilitation services offered
through the child protection system and concerned that they will not be able to
reunify with their children, which could lead to more severe interventions,
especially a termination of parental rights. Indeed, Andrew’s mother—who
consented to Mr. Grant obtaining custody of Andrew, thus closing the child
protection case—may have adopted this tactic. An accused parent making an
informed choice to surrender her opportunity to challenge allegations against her
by consenting to a non-offending parent’s custody differs, of course, from the
law denying an accused parent her opportunity to challenge allegations against
her.
The In re M.L. approach raises complicated policy questions. All other
things being equal, the law should always prefer custody with a fit parent over a
currently or formerly unfit parent. But in real cases, all other things are rarely
equal. The offending parent has often been the primary caretaker the longest and
has developed the deepest bonds with the child. The long-term benefits of
working towards reunification with that parent may be in tension with immediate
custody with the other parent—especially if that other parent lives far away or
has significant conflict with the primary custodial parent.
A similar approach to In re M.L. raises other policy concerns. Maryland
courts have held that a child is “in need of assistance” only if both parents are
unfit.98 Codifying this rule, the Maryland legislature permits a court to dismiss a
case and award custody to the non-offending parent, after sustaining unfitness
allegations against the other parent.99 Unlike In re M.L., this statute requires
adjudication of the allegations against the offending parent and thus complies
with Stanley. But this statutory scheme still raises analogous policy questions—it
requires making a custody decision without essential information. When a child
has been moved from a long-time custodial parent to another parent,
reunification might be appropriate if that parent rehabilitates. But when a court
closes a case immediately after adjudication, it cannot know if such
rehabilitation will occur.
Cases like In re M.L. imply gender stereotypes in a different direction than
the one-parent doctrine. Under the In re M.L. approach, the non-offending parent
(usually the father) gets immediate custody and the offending parent (usually the
mother) does not even get a fitness hearing, even if she wants one. Under that
98. In re Russell G., 672 A.2d 109, 116 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
99. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e) (2013).
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process, the very accusation of abuse or neglect suffices to brand mothers. The
child protection literature has long recognized the essential “bad mother” tropes,
which unduly inform what happens in child protection cases.100 These gender
stereotypes can be particularly pernicious when they intersect with racial or
ethnic stereotypes.101 Labeling a mother bad (with or without a trial),
transferring custody to a father, and closing a case adheres to such stereotypes
and avoids the difficult but essential question: which parent over the long term
will serve the child’s best interests?
D. Observations on the State of the Law
Those two extremes—the one-parent doctrine and In re M.L.—do not fully
represent the state of the law. There is an absence of any generally accepted
approach. Several states have codified statutes or issued appellate decisions
attempting to strike a balance between a non-offending parent’s right to custody
with the formerly custodial parent’s rights. In particular, several states give trial
courts discretion to strike a precise balance on case-specific facts.102 But those
states do not represent the leading approach, and a core law reform task should
be spreading balanced approaches to all states.
The two extreme approaches discussed above share something in
common—they give short shrift to very real constitutional concerns established
in Stanley. Moreover, they ignore key policy reasons to provide more nuanced
approaches to non-custodial and non-offending parents.
Stanley starts the conversation in a better place; unlike the two extreme
options, it focuses on the fitness of each parent claiming custody. And Stanley’s
equal protection holding—rejecting the state’s explicit sex discrimination—also
suggests skepticism of modern practices with implicitly gendered application.
Leslie Joan Harris has identified the few states that offer modest models for
balancing the rights of custodial (and offending) parents against both the rights
of non-offending parents to be granted custody over their children and children’s
rights to maintain relationships with both parents.103 Vivek Sankaran has offered
a proposal to balance those rights: grant non-offending parents’ requests for
custody absent proof of unfitness, but permit courts to take jurisdiction over
cases and order non-offending parents to cooperate with visitation and
100. See, e.g., Marie Ashe, “Bad Mothers,” “Good Lawyers,” and “Legal Ethics”, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2533, 2547 (1993) (describing the “gendered focus of child dependency law” as imposing a
“stigma of ‘badness’” on women); Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family
Court Proceedings, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 558 (2012) (identifying “motherhood
bias” as a core feature of child protection cases); Dohrn, supra note 81, at 5–9 (describing
“misogynistic” family court practices).
101. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell, “Bad” Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV.
L.J. 759, 965–66 (2007); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
28 (2002).
102. Harris, supra note 68, at 303–05. Precisely identifying the correct balance is beyond the
scope of this Article.
103. Id. at 303–07 (summarizing balanced approaches in several states).
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reunification efforts with the other parent.104 This proposal ensures that fitness
remains the centerpiece of cases and that each parent has a right to a fitness
hearing.
Stanley provides the starting point to get to a balanced approach. Stanley
insists that parents from whom the state removes children are entitled to a
hearing on their fitness and that the Constitution prefers the non-offending
parents who step up to raise their children over foster care. This approach
provides legal protections for the relationships between both parents and
children and requires the state to prove both parents unfit before it can claim
custody over the parents’ objections.
The continued presence of doctrines that deny parents custody without a
finding of unfitness ought to be surprising, even shocking, given both the
prevalence of non-marital childbearing and the clarity of Stanley’s focus on
parental fitness forty-four years ago. The field remains uncomfortable with the
topic of non-offending parents and lacks even a basic vocabulary for addressing
these fact patterns.105 Does a court ordering a child to live with a non-offending
and non-custodial parent qualify as “reunification” if the child had never lived in
that parent’s full custody before?106 If not, does it qualify as a parental
placement, in which preferences for parental custody would apply, or a kinship
placement, which might be preferred over state custody but with significantly
less deference than a parent would get?107 Different child protection agency
administrators use different terminology.108 What language should describe the
fathers at issue: non-offending fathers, non-custodial fathers, or non-resident
fathers?109 Court case naming conventions skate over questions about how to

104. Sankaran, supra note 94, at 84–87.
105. Given the absence of a common vocabulary, academic writers often insert definitions
and justifications for their chosen terminology. E.g., Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as Fathers:
The Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 513
n.7 (2013).
106. For an example of a court wrestling with this definitional question and determining that
the term “reunification” could apply, see In re T.S., 74 P.3d 1009, 1015–16 (Kan. 2003).
107. Leslie Joan Harris, for example, notes that North Carolina “has no statute dealing
particularly with nonresidential fathers but instead treats them as ‘relatives.’” Harris, supra note
68, at 302.
108. See WHAT ABOUT THE DADS?, supra note 70, at 39 (“Administrators varied in the
terminology they used for this process [of arranging for a foster child to live with his/her father]:
Some considered it a placement as any other kin placement, while others were adamant that a child
living with a nonresident father should not be called a placement at all.”).
109. One ABA publication refers to “nonresident fathers,” which it defines as “men whose
children are involved in the child welfare system, but who did not live with their children when the
suspected abuse or neglect occurred. They are also often referred to as noncustodial fathers.” ABA
CTR. FOR CHILDREN & THE LAW, ADVOCATING FOR NONRESIDENT FATHERS IN CHILD WELFARE
COURT CASES iii (2009). Vivek Sankaran appears to use the term “non-offending parents” to
describe parents whose children are allegedly maltreated by the other parent, without the nonoffending parent’s knowledge. See generally Vivek S. Sankaran, But I Didn’t Do Anything Wrong:
Revisiting the Rights of Non-Offending Parents in Child Protection Proceedings, 85 MICH. B.J. 22
(2006).
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address a non-offending parent. Courts caption child protection cases “In the
Matter of Child” or “In re Child,” which can imply that the key question is
whether the child has been neglected (in the passive voice), not who neglected
the child or what to do if one parent has not neglected the child.
This issue goes beyond semantics. Kinship placements still must meet some
standard—kin have the burden of establishing their ability to take care of the
child. But it is the state that bears the burden of proving a parent (at least, a
primary custodial parent) unfit. The term “non-offending parent” emphasizes the
absence of parental unfitness and thus the parent’s presumptive right to custody
against the state, while “non-custodial” or “non-resident” suggest that the parent
has lesser rights. More broadly, the inconsistency in the vocabulary used reflects
the unsettled nature of the law, decades after Stanley decided a closely related
case.
IV.
STANLEY’S IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON PRIVATE ADOPTION CASES
Stanley’s due process holding shaped future decisions in every area of
constitutional family law. But it was not followed with equal vigor in each area.
Courts and adoption agencies immediately applied it to private newborn
adoption cases. Such cases involved related but different facts, yet cited Stanley
for the proposition that all unwed fathers, even those who had not raised their
children, had fundamental rights and adoption procedures had to change
dramatically to account for these rights.110 In a subsequent case involving unwed
fathers challenging private adoptions, the Supreme Court eventually modified
these strict interpretations but also confirmed that Stanley applied to them.111
This strong role for Stanley in private adoption cases contrasts sharply with
developments in child protection cases. Part V discusses the way in which state
family courts often ignored Stanley in cases that were far more factually
similar—cases in which child protection agencies intervened due to abuse or
neglect by one parent, and the other parent (usually the father) came forward to
raise the child. Stanley would suggest that such fathers should get custody unless
the state can prove them unfit, but that did not occur in many cases across
various jurisdictions. Family courts and child welfare agencies did not cite or
discuss Stanley in these cases, uncritically assuming that the case did not
apply.112

110. See infra notes 118–25 and accompanying text.
111. Ultimately, the Court held that unwed fathers have an opportunity interest in their
children but can lose constitutional rights if they fail to act on that interest. Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
112. See infra Part V.B.
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A. Immediate, Uncritical Application of Stanley in Private Adoption Cases
Stanley is best known as the first in the quartet of cases defining unwed
fathers’ rights in private family law disputes, especially adoptions. Those cases
culminated in the now well-known rule from Lehr v. Robertson that unwed
biological fathers have an opportunity interest in the care, custody, and control of
their children, but that they must “grasp[] that opportunity” or surrender their
parental rights.113 Lehr upheld state statutes that deemed many unwed fathers
who did not sign up for putative father registries to have failed to grasp that
opportunity interest.114 Those statutes were necessitated by earlier cases that
applied Stanley to private adoption cases.
Unlike the rest of the quartet, Stanley involved no private family law
dispute, only a fight between a father and a state agency that asserted an interest
in protecting children from abuse and neglect. Mr. Stanley had “sired and
raised” his children over many years.115 The disputes in the other cases in the
quartet were between a non-custodial father and a step-father who was living
with the child and the child’s mother and sought to adopt the child; they
involved disagreements between a mother who believed adoption by the stepfather was best for the child and a father who did not, rather than disagreements
between a parent and a state child protection agency.116 Moreover, many unwed
fathers challenging adoptions had not raised children as Peter Stanley had raised
his; at the very least, in private newborn adoptions, the children were simply too
young to have been cared for by any parent. Surely Stanley’s protections for
parents’ rights are relevant to these private family law cases, but Stanley does not
resolve whether an unwed father who has not raised his children has any rights,
let alone how courts should balance an unwed father’s rights with the rights of
an unwed mother who either wants her new partner to adopt the child or wants
the child adopted by someone else.117
Despite the lack of answers to these questions in Stanley, state courts and
adoption agencies applied Stanley in private newborn adoption cases quickly,
strictly, and with little analysis. Resulting media attention focused on how
Stanley (as interpreted) “put[] adoptions in legal limbo.”118 This story began at
the Supreme Court, just two weeks after it decided Stanley. Jerry Rothstein—the

113. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. The other two quartet cases, taken along with Lehr and Stanley,
are Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
114. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250–51.
115. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
116. One early commentator predicted that Stanley would be limited to state interventions.
See Frederick C. Schafrick, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father’s
Parental Rights, 7 FAM. L. Q. 75, 107–08 (1973).
117. Some contemporaneous observers have made this point. See Oscar Marquis, Recent
Decisions: Family Law—Adoptions of Illegitimates, 61 ILL. B.J. 378, 379 (1973) (“[Stanley] can,
however, be read narrowly so as to require the consent of the unwed father only in a similar fact
situation . . . .”).
118. Carol Kleiman, Ruling Puts Adoptions in Legal Limbo, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1972, at B7.
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biological father of a child put up for adoption by the child’s biological mother,
without Rothstein’s consent119—appealed a Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion
holding that, as an unwed father, he had no right to notice or a hearing prior to
the adoption. The Supreme Court vacated the state court ruling and remanded
“for further consideration in light of Stanley.”120 Yet the Court included a signal
that applying Stanley strictly to adoption cases was not inevitable—its remand
order directed the state courts to evaluate the case “with due consideration for
the completion of the adoption proceedings and the fact that the child has
apparently lived with the adoptive family for the intervening period of time.”121
The Wisconsin courts did not immediately take up Rothstein on remand. As
a result, Illinois courts had the first opportunity to apply Stanley in private
adoption cases. Just seven weeks after the Supreme Court decided Stanley, the
Illinois Supreme Court decided a private newborn adoption case. The court
described Stanley as broadly recognizing “that the interests of the father of an
illegitimate child are no different from those of other parents.”122 The court
offered that broad reading of Stanley without carefully articulating why and
without addressing Peter Stanley’s particularly significant role in raising his
children. The Illinois court simply cited Stanley and the Rothstein remand order
and held that the state private adoption statutes were “unconstitutional insofar as
they are in conflict with Stanley [and] Rothstein.”123 Rothstein was a relatively
weak authority given the general rule that an order to vacate and remand does
not decide the merits of a case.124 Courts in other states quickly followed
Illinois’ lead.125
119. The facts are discussed in the underlying state court opinion. State ex rel. Lewis v.
Lutheran Soc. Servs., 178 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Wis. 1970).
120. Rothstein v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 405 U.S. 1051, 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 178 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 1970).
121. Id.
122. Slawek v. Covenant Children’s Home, 284 N.E.2d 291, 292 (Ill. 1972). The Supreme
Court decided Stanley on April 3, 1972, and the Illinois Supreme Court decided Slawek on May
26, 1972.
123. Id. at 292. Slawek also referenced a third case, Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, a custody
case between an unwed mother and father. After the Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that an unwed
father had no rights to the child, 262 N.E.2d 717, 720 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970), the U.S. Supreme Court
remanded for reconsideration in light of Stanley. 405 U.S. 1051, 1051. The father won on remand.
292 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972). This ruling did not extend Stanley, as it involved a father who
had helped raise his children and had been voluntarily given custody of them by their mother. Id. at
147.
124. The Supreme Court clarified that a vacate and remand order did “indicate that we found
[an intervening precedent] sufficiently analogous and, perhaps, decisive to compel re-examination
of the case.” Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777 (1964). Commentators have noted that
the import of such orders can be ambiguous in practice, especially in state courts. Erwin
Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need to Clarify the Meaning of U.S. Supreme Court
Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages’ Cases, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 517–18 (2004).
125. See, e.g., Doe v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 337 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104–07 (Sup. Ct. 1972); State
ex rel. Lewis, 207 N.W.2d at 830 (holding that unwed fathers must receive the same procedural
rights as married parents). State courts also quickly began relying on Stanley to affirm the rights of
unwed fathers to seek custody and visitation rights in suits against their former partners. See, e.g.,
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The first set of law review articles that analyzed Stanley and its implications
in depth also quickly focused on its impact on adoption cases.126 One
commentator questioned the constitutionality of adoption statutes across the
country in light of Stanley.127 He parsed the Court’s wording in footnote 9 of the
Stanley decision to suggest that its holding applied beyond the child protection
context128—even though the Court in that footnote expressed concern
specifically that children will become “wards of the state,” not adopted by
another family.129 Other commentators have relied on the ambiguous and nonprecedential Rothstein remand order for a similar reading.130 One academic—
who also served as reporter-draftsman for the Committee on a Uniform
Parentage Act131—described Stanley in private custody and adoption terms, as
“[a] somewhat imprecise opinion, giving the father an interest in his illegitimate
child’s custody and adoption.”132
B. Stanley Triggers Fast Legislative Reforms Regarding Private Adoptions
The view that Stanley gave unwed fathers interests in their children’s
adoptions informed the first legislative responses to Stanley, which focused
entirely on private adoption cases. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in 1973 in
direct response both to Stanley and other Supreme Court cases disfavoring the
historical treatment of so-called “illegitimate” children.133 The drafters included
a provision requiring termination of birth fathers’ rights when an unmarried
mother “relinquishes or proposes to relinquish for adoption.”134 The drafters
described this provision as responding directly to Stanley, Rothstein, and
Marshall v. Stefanides, 302 A.2d 682, 688 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); Doe v. Doe, 307 A.2d 166,
169 (Conn. 1972).
126. Other contemporaneous articles cite Stanley but do not address it in depth. See, e.g.,
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1972) (noting Stanley but dismissing the
extended applicability of the equal protection holding it contains).
127. See Benjamin G. Reeves, Protecting the Putative Father’s Rights after Stanley v.
Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115, 116 (1973–1974).
128. Id. at 125–26.
129. Id. at 126 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972)).
130. See Peter C. Bazos, Due Process and Equal Protection, Classifications Based on
Illegitimacy, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 908, 909–10 n.15 (1973); Tracy S. Rich, Plight of the Putative
Father in California Child Custody Proceedings: A Problem of Equal Protection, 6 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 15–16 (1973).
131. See Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 Fam. L.Q. 1, 1 (1974).
132. Id. at 7. Krause went on to note that applying Stanley to adoption cases was “causing
difficulty with the adoption process in many states,” id., though he suggested that some state courts
had applied Stanley “very broadly, probably overly broadly,” id. at 12.
133. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1973) (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972)).
134. Id. § 25(a) (governing adoptions of unmarried women’s children, including children
who did not have a presumed or legal father under other provisions of the UPA).
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Vanderlaan, focusing exclusively on private adoptions rather than child
protection cases and asserting that the UPA seeks to “safeguard” those adoptions
rather than the rights of fit parents.135 The UPA’s reporter-draftsman, Harry D.
Krause, described the statute as creating a mechanism for identifying “the
disinterested unmarried father” and the “very speedy termination of his potential
rights” when a mother consents to an adoption.136 The UPA also established
procedures for unwed fathers to establish legal paternity,137 and those
procedures could be relevant in child protection cases to determine whether a
specific man is a child’s father. But the UPA was not drafted with this purpose in
mind. None of its provisions or comments discusses the child protection system.
Nor did a contemporaneous law review article by Krause discuss any intended
impact on child protection cases, custody claims between a parent and the state,
or custody claims beyond infant adoptions.138
Subsequently, state policy-makers and, ultimately, the Supreme Court
established rules for applying Stanley in these private adoption cases. The
Uniform Law Commission lists 14 states as having adopted the 1973 UPA.139
Other states enacted their own statutes recognizing rights of some unwed fathers
in private adoption cases.140 Child welfare organizations sought to limit unwed
fathers’ rights to those “who have either acknowledged paternity or been so
adjudicated.”141 State legislatures adopted new statutes granting unwed fathers
some rights while also establishing laws to limit the rights of fathers.142 In 1976,
New York established a putative father registry and denied fathers who failed to
sign up for such registries the right to object to their children’s adoption—
135. Id. § 25 cmt. (“In the light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Stanley v. Illinois,
Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan, and Vanderlaan v.
Vanderlaan, and related state court decisions, it is considered essential that the unknown or
unascertained father’s potential rights be terminated formally in order to safeguard the subsequent
adoption.”) (citations omitted). The “safeguard” terminology was repeated in a law review article
by the UPA’s reporter-draftsman. Krause, supra note 131, at 14. For a summary of Vanderlaan,
see supra text accompanying note 123.
136. Krause, supra note 131, at 14.
137. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1973).
138. Krause, supra note 131.
139. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET PARENTAGE ACT (1973), http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title =Parentage%
20Act%20(1973) [https://perma.cc/EDY3-4GGW] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
140. For instance, the South Carolina legislature enacted a statute in 1981 requiring an unwed
father’s consent to an adoption “if he has consistently on a continuing basis exercised rights and
performed duties as a parent.” South Carolina Children’s Code, 1981 S.C. Acts 71 (codified as
amended at S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1710(b)). The legislature has subsequently amended that law to
more precisely describe when an unwed father’s consent is required. South Carolina Children’s
Code, 2008 S.C. Acts 361 (codified as amended at S.C. Code Ann. § 63-9-310(A)(4)–(5)).
141. Reeves, supra note 127, at 135 (quoting the Child Welfare League of America’s
statement following a joint meeting with the American Bar Association in the fall of 1972).
142. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 127, at 132–33 (describing a Michigan statute enacted
shortly after Stanley requiring unwed fathers who did not live with their children’s mother to file a
“notice of intent to claim paternity”).
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legislation approved by the Supreme Court in Lehr.143 State courts also found
exceptions to applying Stanley in private adoption cases. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied one such exception to uphold the adoption in Rothstein
on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court.144 The Supreme Court then decided a
series of cases in which unwed fathers challenged the private adoptions of their
children, and the Court distinguished between fathers who had seized their
opportunity interest in their children and those who had not145 (or, in Krause’s
terminology, interested and disinterested fathers). These changes culminated in
the Lehr rule discussed above.146
C. Lessons from Stanley’s Application to Private Adoptions
The initially strict application of Stanley to private adoptions and quick
legislative reforms illustrate several points. First, the initial reaction to Stanley
involved a superficial analysis of Stanley’s holding and the ways it might apply
in private family law cases; a more nuanced view took several years of
legislative and case law developments.
Second, this early application of Stanley to private adoptions solidified the
idea that Stanley’s due process holding in a public family law case begins our
understanding of due process rights in private family law cases. A more
concerning corollary may also be true—these legal developments may have
solidified into a widespread understanding that Stanley was primarily a case
about unwed fathers’ rights, especially in the context of private adoptions, rather
than a parents’ rights case more generally or a leading case about state
intervention in family life. The academy now generally discusses Stanley as the
first of the unwed fathers’ quartet.147 Casebooks—even those casebooks that
143. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 2017); see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
265 (1983).
144. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that a father abandoned his opportunity interest in
his child by initially denying paternity and refusing to provide any assistance to his former partner
during her pregnancy. See State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 227 N.W.2d 643, 646–47
(Wisc. 1975). The father in that case changed his mind about providing for the mother while the
mother was still pregnant. He sought involvement with the baby but the mother returned multiple
letters that he wrote to her. He could not find her and the baby until after the birth, by which time
the mother had surrendered the baby for adoption. Id. at 646. The Wisconsin court ruled that
“Rothstein abandoned the child” and thus abandoned any interest that could have overcome the
mother’s desire to place the child for adoption, even when he changed his mind before the child
was born. Id. at 647.
145. The Court in Lehr, decided after Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977), and Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), presented the issue as acknowledging that “the biological
connection . . . offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a
relationship with his offspring,” and asking the crucial question of whether he has “grasp[ed] that
opportunity.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. See also Krause, supra note 131, at 14.
146. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in
the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2300 (2016); Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up
Pops?: How to Determine When Putative Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn
Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 157–58 (2006); David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the
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address child abuse and neglect law—present Stanley alongside adoption cases,
even though it actually involved a father fighting the child protection agency for
custody.148
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—the quickly enacted set of
legislative reforms reflect the power of the private adoption bar. Adoption
agencies and adoptive families had lawyers who could focus their attention on
Stanley’s application and develop effective responses to early state court
decisions by applying Stanley strictly to private adoption cases. With the
attention of these lawyers, the statutory and constitutional law regarding unwed
fathers in private adoptions developed quickly, creating the legal landscape that
largely remains intact today. As the next section describes, these legal
developments contrast with what happened in child protection cases—in which
the law governing non-offending parents developed without reference to the
explicitly relevant Supreme Court precedent.
V.
MEANWHILE IN NON-OFFENDING PARENT CASES, STANLEY WAS IGNORED
One would expect the state action in public family law cases—a state
agency taking custody of children over parents’ objections and placing them in
state-licensed temporary foster homes— to trigger important procedural
protections or at least careful consideration of how Stanley should impact
procedures in individual cases. Yet while the UPA and putative father registries
were developed for private adoptions, “child welfare proceedings remained a
world apart.”149 In particular, policy-makers and state courts began crafting rules
that allowed states to deprive non-offending parents of custody of their children
without any allegations or proof of parental unfitness.150 Stanley questions, if not
Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 758–60 (1999); Carolyn
Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in
Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, 1074 (1996). In
one leading recent work, this story has been condensed to a footnote, citing Stanley and Lehr and
the rule that emerged from that quartet. Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal
Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 203 n.198 (2015). Mass media
publications similarly present Stanley as a landmark case providing rights to unwed fathers
generally, and the first case in a series leading to Lehr. E.g., Kevin Noble Maillard, A Father’s
Struggle to Stop His Daughter’s Adoption, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2015), http://www.msn.com/enus/news/us/a-father%E2%80%99s-struggle-to-stop-his-daughter%E2%80%99s-adoption/ar-AAc
ERlJ [https://perma.cc/X9KT-8Y83].
148. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, SARAH H. RAMSEY & SUSAN V. MANGOLD, CHILDREN
AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE 665 (5th ed. 2014) (placing Stanley in a chapter
on “Adoption” rather than “Abuse and Neglect” or “Foster Care”); PETER N. SWISHER, ANTHONY
MILLER & JANA B. SINGER, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 668 (2d ed. 1998).
149. Harris, supra note 68, at 286.
150. State courts were the essential legal players. Federal court review was limited by
Supreme Court decisions limiting federal courts’ power to hear cases challenging state child
protection proceedings. See Lehman v. Lycoming Co. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502,
516 (1982) (denying federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in a parent’s challenge to a completed child
protection case); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1979) (applying abstention bars to federal
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prohibits, such policies. As described in Part III.A and III.B, these policy
developments have a distinctly gendered tone, because non-offending parents are
overwhelming fathers. Stanley’s equal protection holding should raise doubts
about a strongly gendered doctrine in child protection law. While private
adoption cases applied Stanley uncritically, they at least recognized the
precedential value of the case. Yet for these child protection cases, in which
Stanley even more clearly applied, authorities adopted questionable practices
with no explicit consideration of the case.
As noted in Part III, some difficult questions exist regarding how to apply
Stanley in non-offending parent cases—especially how to strike an appropriate
balance between a primary custodial parent who rehabilitates from some
temporary unfitness and a fit parent who has not previously exercised primary
custody. Answering these questions starts with Stanley, but the relevant
authorities in child protection law largely ignored that case, especially in the
years immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision.
A. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
The first example of family courts ignoring Stanley came in an esoteric
corner of child welfare law—the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children (ICPC) and, in particular, the question of its application to a parent in
one state seeking custody of a child taken by child protective services authorities
in another. This question arises in thousands of cases each year.151 The Compact
is designed to ensure some safety checks occur before a court or agency sends a
child from one state to another for, in the Compact’s terms, a foster or adoptive
placement.152 Consider a child in foster care in Maryland and a potential foster
parent in the District of Columbia.153 When the Compact applies, it requires the
court intervention in ongoing child protection cases); Martin Guggenheim, State Intervention in the
Family: Making a Federal Case Out of It, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1984) (discussing these and other
procedural bars to federal court intervention). Parents may be able to bring Section 1983 claims for
damages, but only when their claim was not fully litigated in state court (and thus barred from
relitigation in a later case) and when the challenged action was by a state employee or agency
rather than a court decision. Id. at 410–14, 424; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2017). Direct appeals to
the Supreme Court remained possible, but were, of course, rarely heard.
151. Precise figures are hard to find, but an Anne E. Casey Foundation report identified
11,741 ICPC referrals regarding parents in eleven states between 2006 and 2011. VIVEK S.
SANKARAN, MICHIGAN LAW, FOSTER KIDS IN LIMBO: THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON
THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN ON THE PERMANENCY OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 4 (2014),
https://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/pcl/Documents/Final%20Summary%20to%20Cas
ey.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARV5-9VSE].
152. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, art. III(a). The Compact can be found
at http://www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/en/ICPCArticle.html [https://perma.cc/57MV-E97L].
State legislatures have codified it. E.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1422 (2001).
153. I describe a hypothetical case. But it is one that repeats itself frequently. One could, of
course, substitute other jurisdictions, especially metropolitan areas that cross state lines, as along
the border between the District of Columbia and Maryland—for example, in big cities like
Charlotte, Chicago, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Memphis, New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis and
smaller towns like Augusta, the Quad Cities, and Texarkana.
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District to perform a home study and conclude that the foster placement would
serve the child’s interests before a Maryland foster care agency or family court
may place the child there.154
If we change the hypothetical so that a District of Columbia parent seeks
custody of that same child, the constitutional questions under Stanley become
apparent: A state agency has placed a child in foster care in Maryland because
her mother, who lives in the suburbs outside of the District of Columbia,
neglected her. The child has visited regularly with her father, who lives one mile
away in the District. The father and mother never married, but the father has
clearly seized his opportunity interest in the child and helped raise her. No party
alleges that he has abused, neglected, or abandoned his child. Applying the
Compact raises several constitutional problems. First, that application denies the
fit father custody (and denies the child the benefits of her father’s custody) while
an agency performs a home study. Second, the father enjoys no presumption of
parental fitness—he must prove that the child should live with him by passing
the home study, rather than the state having to prove him unfit before taking
custody over his objection.155 Third, the standard applied addresses the child’s
interests, not the parent’s fitness. Fourth, the Compact does not provide a hearing
at which the father can challenge a state agency’s finding that he should not have
his child, which violates his entitlement to a fitness hearing under Stanley.156
Such a scenario does have some nuance. The state might have a legitimate
interest in confirming the biological relationship between the District of
Columbia father and the child. In many cases the state may question whether the
father has seized his opportunity interest in his relationship with the child and
whether he was complicit in the other parent’s abuse or neglect. If he obtains
custody, the family court should wrestle with whether to keep the case open to
supervise the mother’s rehabilitation and make any rulings regarding long-term
custody between the father, who has the advantage of being a non-offending
parent, and the mother, who often has the advantage of being the longer-term
primary caretaker.
Given that Stanley’s holding is directly on point, no court should apply the
Compact to parents without analyzing Stanley. Yet in 1976, just four years after
Stanley, a group of state officials—the Association of Administrators of the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children—decided to apply the Compact
to parents, using language directly contrary to Stanley, without even discussing
the case. The administrators responded to a request for an advisory opinion in

154. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, art. III(d).
155. Stanley did not explicitly determine who bears the burden of proof regarding parental
fitness, but strongly suggested the state does. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646, 652 (1972);
see supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
156. For a constitutional and policy critique of the ICPC’s (continuing) application to noncustodial parents, see Vivek S. Sankaran, Out of State and Out of Luck: The Treatment of NonCustodial Parents Under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 25 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 63 (2006).
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1976 about an interstate family.157 Two parents had divorced and the children
lived with their mother.158 A child protection agency later obtained custody of
the children due to the mother’s unfitness. The administrators considered
whether the Compact should apply when the out-of-state father sought custody
of those children.159
The administrators insisted that the Compact applied to the father in terms
difficult to square with Stanley. The administrators wrote, “It cannot be assumed
that a mother or father is a suitable recipient of a child merely because he or she
is the natural parent.”160 The mother’s unfitness, according to the administrators,
proved that “where trouble has already occurred”—even when the non-offending
parent was not involved in the “trouble”—that fitness “may need to be
ascertained rather than presumed.”161 Intriguingly, the administrators did not cite
any legal authority besides the Compact itself; they made no reference to
Stanley, to a constitutional presumption of fitness, or to exceptions to such a
presumption. They offered no discussion about whether the burden of proof
regarding the non-offending parent’s fitness should lie on the parent or on the
state. Later that year, the administrators reaffirmed their view, writing that the
Compact existed because of “the need to ascertain whether the home of a
biological parent is in fact able to care for a child.”162
The administrators’ approach contrasts starkly with Stanley. The
administrators saw application of the Compact as providing essential
“protections” against possibly unfit parents and believed those protections
outweighed the harm of being kept in foster care.163 Stanley, in contrast, noted
that “children suffer from uncertainty and dislocation” when the state forces such
protections upon them without first considering parental fitness.164 By applying
the Compact to a non-offending parent, the administrators refused to presume
parental fitness and insisted parents establish their fitness to a social worker—
with no judicial remedy.165 Stanley explicitly envisioned a judicial hearing on
157. ICPC Secretariat Opinion No. 32 (Sept. 8, 1976), reprinted in AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS.
ASS’N, 1 COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR MANUAL 3.54, 3.54 (2002).
158. If anything, the father’s case was stronger than Peter Stanley’s because he had been
married to the children’s mother and thus had unquestioned legal paternity.
159. ICPC Secretariat Opinion No. 32, at 3.55–56.
160. Id. at 3.55.
161. Id.
162. ICPC Secretariat Opinion No. 34 (1976), reprinted in AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS’N, 1
COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR MANUAL 3.5861, 3.59 (2002).
163. Id.
164. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
165. Article III(d) of the Compact provides that, when it applies, children can only be placed
across state lines when “the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the
sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary
to the interests of the child.” Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, art. III(d), http://
www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/en/ICPCArticle.html [https://perma.cc/H9VE-8D9V]. Applying
the Compact to a non-offending parent therefore requires such a parent to convince “appropriate
public authorities” that it is not “contrary to the interests of” the parent’s own child to live with the
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fitness and noted that failing to provide one ran contrary to any legitimate child
protection interest.166
The administrators made no effort to explain away Stanley—they simply
ignored it. And in its place, they wrapped themselves in vague rhetoric about
their beneficent purposes: the Compact should be applied “liberally” to ensure
all children “have maximum opportunity for a suitable” placement and that state
authorities “have knowledge of the placement and its circumstances” and
confidence in its quality.167 Applying the Compact’s “protections”168 to parents
have led to absurd results—for instance, keeping children in foster care rather
than with a parent because a social worker’s home study concluded that a twobedroom home was too small for a father, his mother, and his child.169
The administrators’ opinion survived because many courts similarly ignored
Stanley. At least eight state courts have upheld application of the Compact
against parents whom the state did not allege or prove to have abused or
neglected their children or to be otherwise unfit.170 Like the administrators’ 1976
opinion, these courts’ analyses rest on an assumption directly contrary to
Stanley’s constitutional presumption that custody with fit parents serves
children’s interests. One court, contradicting this presumption, asserted that
“[o]nce a court has legal custody of a child, it would be negligent to relinquish
that child to an out-of-state parent without some indication that the parent is able
to care for the child appropriately.”171 Stanley suggests that courts may not
maintain such children in foster care absent some evidence of the parent’s
unfitness, but rather than find an exception to Stanley, the courts simply ignore
it; none of the eight cases even mentions Stanley.

parent. Id. The Compact includes no provision for parents to appeal a refusal of public officials to
so find.
166. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
167. ICPC Secretariat Opinion No. 32, at 3.54–55.
168. Id. at 3.59.
169. In re D.-F.M., 236 P.3d 961, 963 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). The trial court placed the child
with his father despite this ruling, but only after much time had passed and over the child
protection agency’s objection. That decision was upheld on appeal, in one of the cases discussed in
Part V.C. that may indicate a resurrection of Stanley. Id. at 963, 967.
170. Faison v. Capozello, 856 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 2008); Green v. Div. of Family
Servs., 864 A.2d 921 (Del. 2004); H.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 838 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003); Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513 (Ariz. 2001); K.D.G.L.B.P. v.
Hinds Co. DHS, 771 So. 2d 907 (Miss. 2000); D.S.S. v. Clay Cty. Dep’t of Human Res., 755 So.
2d 584 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass. 1998); see also State
ex rel. Juv. Dep’t of Clackamas Co. v. Smith, 811 P.2d 145, 147 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 1991)
(providing in dicta that “[t]he compact does apply to a child who is sent to another state for
placement with parents or relatives, when someone other than a parent or relative makes the
placement”).
171. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Benway, 745 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding that a child in Florida could not be returned to his biological father in Vermont until the
State of Vermont approved the placement).
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B. One-Parent Doctrine
Just as the Interstate Compact administrators and the courts that upheld their
decisions raised serious Stanley questions without mentioning the case, family
court judges also ignored Stanley in cases in which both parents lived within one
state. When a family court ruled one parent unfit and the other in-state parent
sought custody, jurisdictions split.172
Some states established the one-parent doctrine and held that finding one
parent unfit sufficed to deprive the other parent of custody. This doctrine also
raises a number of obvious questions under Stanley, including most importantly
whether it violates the non-offending parent’s constitutional right to custody
absent a hearing on—and proof of—that parent’s unfitness. One-parent doctrine
cases, like the Compact cases described above in Part V.A, did not cite or
discuss Stanley when adopting related doctrine.173 As one commentator has put
it, “[i]n these jurisdictions, Supreme Court precedent has played little impact in
shaping the jurisprudence involving non-offending parents.”174
The 1979 California case In re LaShonda B. illustrates how the one-parent
doctrine evolved in the years following Stanley.175 The state child protection
agency removed LaShonda—a two-month-old infant—after her mother abused
her.176 The father “travelled frequently in his employment as a plasterer and had
no permanent residence” but stayed at the homes of various relatives.177 He
planned for his infant daughter to remain in relatives’ full-time care, presumably
with him living with the child when he stayed with relatives.178 The state did not
allege that he had abused or neglected the child or that he was unfit. And it
would have been hard for the state to do so. There was no evidence he had
abused the child. The worst the state could say was that he planned to leave the
child with family members while he traveled for work. Yet millions of children
live with family members other than their parents.179 The family court found that
he was “able to care for the child,” including through “proper day-care
172. For a summary of jurisdictions’ differing approaches, see Good-Dworak & Johnson,
supra note 75, at 205–06.
173. In re C.R., 646 N.W.2d 506 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); In re A.R., 330 S.W.3d 858 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2011), In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d 1188 (Ohio 2006), and In re Amber G., 554 N.W.2d 142
(Neb. 1996). None of these cases cites or seeks to distinguish Stanley. The only citation to Stanley
relates to a different point. Amber G., 554 N.W.2d at 150 (citing Stanley for the difference between
custody or guardianship and adoption).
174. Good-Dworak & Johnson, supra note 75, at 205.
175. In re LaShonda B., 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1979).
176. Id. at 281.
177. Id. at 282.
178. Id.
179. The Census reports that more than 2.8 million children live with adults other than their
parents—2.28 million with relatives, and 558,000 with nonrelatives. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OLD: 1960 TO PRESENT, tbl.CH-1 (2016), available
at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/children.html [https://perma.cc/
5XQA-EUCJ]. In 1979, when LaShonda B. was decided, the figures were also large—2.56 million
children living without parents, 2.14 with relatives and 423,000 with non-relatives. Id.
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arrangements.”180 Citing a prior appellate case, which had quoted Stanley at
length in reversing an adjudication that a child was dependent based only on one
parent’s unfitness, the trial court granted him custody and closed the child
protection case.181 The state appealed.182
In re LaShonda B. presented what could have been some complicated postStanley questions. Had the unwed father been involved enough in the baby’s life
to assert parental rights? If so, was he entitled to the same deference as Peter
Stanley, who had “sired and raised” his children? What specific procedure was
he entitled to—a trial on his fitness or some other less formal procedure after
adjudication of the mother’s unfitness?183 After the court gave him custody,
should it have kept the child protection case open to supervise the mother’s
rehabilitation efforts? These questions may not have easy answers. As the only
Supreme Court case involving unwed fathers’ rights and decided just seven years
prior, and as the core authority in the state court case relied upon by the trial
court, Stanley should have been a starting point for the analysis.
Stanley was entirely absent from the In re LaShonda B. court’s discussion.
The California appellate court instead cited a pre-Stanley state court decision to
overturn the trial court and keep LaShonda in foster care.184 Moreover, the court
offered no clear discussion of what legal standards applied to non-offending
parents like LaShonda’s father; the court suggested that “employment, a stable
residence, and appropriate day-care arrangements” were required.185 The court
offered no discussion of parental fitness and no discussion of whether Stanley’s
fitness standard applied or, if so, the appropriate way to apply it to LaShonda’s
father’s work and housing situation. The father did not appear to raise a fitness
argument explicitly, instead defending the trial court’s ruling that he was able to
take care of his child.186 Nonetheless, the court’s analysis ran directly into
Stanley’s fitness discussion. The In re LaShonda B. analysis suggests that the
court could take jurisdiction based on the mother’s abuse and then maintain
jurisdiction based on the father’s poverty—even if that poverty would not justify
taking jurisdiction in the first instance.187 The In re LaShonda B. court offered
no guidance for distinguishing impoverished yet fit parents from those whose
children must live in foster care and did not note that the court in Stanley
disapproved of procedures that made it difficult for “impecunious” parents to
180. LaShonda B., 157 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
181. Id. at 283 (citing In re Kelvin M., 143 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1978)).
182. Id. at 281.
183. LaShonda B. suggested the latter. Id. at 283.
184. Id. (citing In re Adele L., 267 Cal. App.2d 397 (1968)).
185. Id. at 284.
186. The court stated “We have no due process issue before us . . . .” Id. at 283. The briefs in
the case are unavailable. Email from California Court of Appeal, Second District, Clerk, Jan. 19,
2017 (stating that the records in this case had been destroyed) (on file with author).
187. California courts later confirmed that poverty alone, “even abject poverty resulting in
homelessness, is not a valid basis for assertion of juvenile court jurisdiction.” In re P.C., 80 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 595, 599 (Ct. App. 2008).
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regain custody.188 The court in In re LaShonda B. imposed the burden of proof
on the non-offending parent to “make a sufficient showing that he or she is
capable,” rather than requiring the state to prove him or her incapable.189
The In re LaShonda B. court relied on the positive goals of child protection
actions, asserting that “[a] petition is brought on behalf of the child, not to
punish the parents.”190 Stanley, of course, had required a hearing on parental
fitness and suggested that states did not serve children’s interests by avoiding a
focus on fitness. Nonetheless, this language from In re LaShonda B. has echoed
in subsequent court decisions adopting the one-parent doctrine, including those
directly citing In re LaShonda B.191 and other cases making similar points.192
Under these cases, once the state proves one parent unfit, then the state’s child
protection agency becomes the driving force by working to reunite the child
through a case plan. This work presumes the non-offending parent needs
rehabilitation, even if the state has not alleged or proven him unfit. The state will
often raise fitness only if it tries to terminate the non-offending parent’s rights or
if the non-offending parent seeks custody sooner.193 In one case, the state agency
pursued such a course for nearly four years and alleged the non-offending father
was unfit only after it decided to stop working towards custody with him.194
Other cases rely on the fact that parents can regain custody to justify foster care
placements without any fitness findings, essentially regarding the custody loss as
a temporary inconvenience.195 In contrast, Stanley emphasized that “children
suffer from uncertainty and dislocation” during such separations, and this was
one reason a fitness finding was a necessary prerequisite to state custody.196

188. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972).
189. LaShonda B., 157 Cal. Rptr. at 284–85.
190. Id. at 283.
191. See, e.g., In re Constance G., 529 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Neb. 1995) (citing LaShonda B.,
157 Cal. Rptr. at 284).
192. See, e.g., In re B.R., 97 A.3d 867, 870–71 (Vt. 2014) (noting that “the focus of a CHINS
proceeding is the welfare of the child,” and approving the trial court’s focus on the child’s
“welfare, rather than on the respective unfitness of each parent”); In re A.R., 330 S.W.3d 858, 863
(Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that once a family court obtained jurisdiction based on one parent’s
unfitness, “the court then has the inherent jurisdiction to award custody as it deems will preserve
and protect the child’s welfare”); In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Ohio 2006) (describing a
neglect finding as “a determination about the care and condition of a child” that only “implicitly”
addresses a parent’s fitness, making explicit findings unnecessary).
193. See In re Amber G., 554 N.W.2d 142, 149–50 (Neb. 1996) (describing state’s
reunification efforts without explaining why the father had to participate in them). Amber G.
upheld depriving a non-offending parent of custody based on abuse or neglect by the other parent,
so long as the non-offending parent could later attempt to make “a sufficient showing that he or
she is capable of providing proper parental care.” Id. at 150. The court did require an unfitness
finding against the non-offending parent, id. at 149, but permitted that this finding be delayed
multiple years, during which the father did not have custody.
194. Id. at 150.
195. See, e.g., In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at 1192.
196. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
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Other cases treated a non-offending father as a “nonparty” to the case, even
when he appeared at hearings seeking custody.197
Some states have codified the difference between the constitutional fitness
standard adopted in Stanley and the treatment provided to non-offending
parents.198 For instance, Missouri statutes provide that non-offending parents do
not have a right to custody if they have any criminal history or drug and alcohol
abuse within the previous five years.199 A single arrest for marijuana possession
five years prior—perhaps before the child was even born—could deprive such a
parent of custody. In contrast, proving unfitness requires some nexus between
any past criminal or drug history and the parent’s ability to take care of the
child.200 Maine has codified this difference indirectly, providing that a court can
place a child in foster care pending a trial if it finds “that returning the child to
the child’s custodian”—singular—“would place the child in immediate risk of
serious harm.”201 North Carolina authorizes the state to take custody based on
one parent’s abuse or neglect and treats non-offending parents as no different
than other relatives who seek custody yet lack any protected constitutional
status.202
State statutory and case law vary significantly. Several states have clearly
held that non-offending parents have a right to custody absent the state proving
them unfit.203 Several other states make it easier for family courts to grant nonoffending parents custody but still fail to address Stanley directly. California
(after In re LaShonda B.) adopted a statute providing that a non-offending
parent’s request for custody should be adjudicated under a “detriment”
standard.204 While “detriment” is usually seen as a more favorable standard to
parents than best interests,205 some courts have also called it a “nebulous
197. See, e.g., In re Tumari W., 885 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754 (App. Div. 2009). Tumari W. was an
Interstate Compact case, which distinguished an earlier precedent that would have required the
release of the child to a non-offending father. Id. at 757 (citing In re Alfredo S., 568 N.Y.S.2d 123
(App. Div. 1991)).
198. Counter examples exist as well, as noted in Part III.C. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-819(e) (2013).
199. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.037.1(3) (2016).
200. Indeed, commentators summarizing generally-accepted law say that there must be such
a nexus for parents who presently suffer from some form of substance abuse. “Generally, the mere
existence of a parent’s alcoholism or substance abuse does not constitute grounds for a dependency
unless the parent demonstrates an unwillingness or inability to properly care for the child. The
attorney for the parent should insist that the inquiry focus on the actual parenting of the child.”
ANN HARALAMBIE, 1 HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 11.13, 591 (1993,
current as of 2008 Supp.).
201. ME. REV. STAT. § 4034(4) (2004).
202. Harris, supra note 68, at 301–02 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-506(h)(2) (2004)).
203. See, e.g., In re Bill F., 761 A.2d 470, 475–76 (N.H. 2000) (holding that “upon request” a
non-offending parent is entitled to custody unless the state can prove unfitness at a “full hearing”);
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e); N.H. REV. STAT. § 169-C:19-e(I) (2010).
204. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(a) (West 2016).
205. See In re Jonathan P., 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 858–59 (Ct. App. 2014). But see In re
Jacob P., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 817, 824 (Ct. App. 2007) (describing detriment and best interests as
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standard” that implicates the “emotional security of the child”206 and considers
factors such as children’s wishes—which would not arise in a fitness analysis.207
The California statute also gives the court discretion to determine whether to
give the non-offending parent permanent custody and terminate jurisdiction
immediately upon placing the child with that parent—effectively ending the
other parent’s rehabilitation efforts—or keep the case open.208 Florida has
adopted a similar statute.209
A related but less frequently litigated issue is whether an agency possesses a
duty to help non-custodial fathers establish legal paternity. In the Grant case, the
case study discussed in Part III.A, the GAL argued that the agency failed to
make reasonable efforts to prevent removal, because it failed to make any efforts
to establish paternity before the baby was ready for discharge, which would have
rendered foster care unnecessary. This argument rests in the statutory duty of
each state to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal.210 The argument lost in
that case, but at least one commentator has argued that state agencies should
make efforts to “determine legal paternity promptly.”211 As the Grant case
illustrates, that has not been the practice. Regardless of any rights Stanley might
recognize in unwed fathers, state agencies do not appear to have regularly
offered even minimal assistance to such fathers establishing their legal paternity
before taking custody of children. Congress passed a law in 1980 requiring states
to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal.212 I have been unable to find a
reported state court decision suggesting that such efforts include assistance to
establish paternity until 2010. In that case, the court noted that it is not “unduly
burdensome” for an agency to assist a parent with a voluntary acknowledgement
of paternity by referring non-custodial fathers to appropriate agencies and
providing evidence regarding paternity already in the state’s possession.213 The
“basically two sides of the same coin” (quoting In re Randalynne G., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880
(2002)).
206. In re C.C., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168, 176 (Ct. App. 2009).
207. In re C.M., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 212 (Ct. App. 2014).
208. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(b).
209. Under Florida law, if the previously custodial parent cannot have custody, then the other
parent “shall” have custody if he or she so desires, but only after a home study and not if “the court
finds that such placement would endanger the safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional
health of the child.” FLA. STAT. § 39.521(3)(b). This standard is more favorable to parents than a
best interests test. See T.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 992 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008). But just as “detriment” may be a somewhat different standard than fitness, finding a
risk to a child’s “well-being” may also provide less protection than a fitness standard. Additionally,
the Florida statute, like California, gives courts discretion to give a non-offending parent custody
and close a case, ending the other parent’s court-supervised rehabilitative services. FLA. STAT. §
39.521(b)(1)–(2) (2016).
210. States must adopt a state plan in compliance with federal law to receive federal foster
care funding. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2012).
211. Harris, supra note 68, at 297–99.
212. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 503 §
671(a)(15) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)).
213. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 605 (Tenn. 2010).
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court stated this point without any citation to prior cases, suggesting both a
dearth of attention given to it both by agencies and by lawyers who might
question agency actions. The court also suggested that a minimal level of
assistance would suffice, approving as “reasonable efforts” an agency action that
simply told a father to “take the results [of a paternity test] to the juvenile court,”
even when, perhaps predictably, the father was unable to establish paternity
without more substantial assistance.214
C. Explaining Child Protection Cases That Ignored Stanley
There is no easy explanation for how the first Supreme Court case regarding
child protection law was ignored in a large number of child protection cases
raising factually similar questions. We cannot interrogate the relevant
authorities’ stated reasons for ignoring Stanley, because they did not offer any.
We can, however, suggest several explanations. First, counsel for non-offending
parents had long been inadequate and, despite progress celebrated at this
symposium, remains so in many jurisdictions. Second, and relatedly, children’s
advocates were more firmly established in the years following Stanley and,
especially in those years, were not likely to challenge the doctrines discussed in
this part. Third, a single Supreme Court opinion was simply insufficient to
reform a deeply ingrained family court culture, especially without strong
advocates to challenge that culture. Fourth, soon after Stanley, child protection
law adopted a legislative and policy focus, which avoided wrestling with how to
apply Stanley—a marked contrast to the quick consideration of how Stanley
would impact private adoption cases discussed in Part IV.
1. Counsel for Non-Offending Parents
Providing counsel to help individuals facing state invasions of their
constitutional rights is an essential means of protecting those rights. Without
lawyers, unrepresented litigants are unlikely to effectively assert specific rights
they arguably had under Stanley. And following the Stanley decision, the United
States lacked a system to provide parents with counsel, let alone quality counsel.
Stanley’s trial court history reflected that reality,215 but a parent’s right to
counsel did not reach the Supreme Court, whose decision said nothing about the
issue. Most non-offending parents were unlikely to have access to attorneys in
many states.216 No significant parents’ bar in child protection cases existed in
the years immediately following Stanley. In 1981, the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution does not provide a right to counsel in termination of parental

214. Id. at 605–06. The court faulted the father for not informing the agency that he needed
more help. Id. at 606.
215. See supra Part II.B.
216. Harris, supra note 68, at 287 n.28.
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rights cases.217 If parents had no constitutional right to counsel in permanent
termination cases, then parents surely had no constitutional right to counsel in
cases leading to a temporary placement in foster care.
There was no group of attorneys insisting that family courts give nonoffending parents hearings on their fitness, or questioning state agencies’
assertions that children should come into foster care. Parent defense is marked
by its “relative youth” and did not develop until the enactment of federal statutes
in the 1970s, hitting powerful roadblocks along the way—not least of which was
the Supreme Court’s refusal to require states to provide parents with
attorneys.218 Significant growth in the parents’ bar has been dated to the twentyfirst century—more than 30 years after Stanley.219 As a result, in the years
immediately following Stanley, the capacity to challenge the development of the
one-parent doctrine and the application of the Interstate Compact to parents was
functionally quite limited. When parents did have lawyers, available records
suggest that they did not consistently raise constitutional arguments based on
Stanley, even when a case presented issues relating to Stanley.220
2. Counsel for Children
Children were provided a stronger system of courtroom advocates (at least
compared to parents) soon after Stanley. The Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974 required states to provide guardians ad litem (GALs) for
children in child protection cases.221 GALs are obligated to represent what they
believe to be in a child’s best interest, not the child’s stated interests. Much ink
has been spilled on the subject of children’s representation,222 and the topic does
not require rehashing here. It suffices to note that, while the topic continues to be
debated, there is a strong argument that, in practice, children’s lawyers
(especially best interest advocates) “serve state interests” by supporting state
intervention in families.223 Laws permitting children’s lawyers to substitute their
own judgment of what is best for their clients for their clients’ wishes, explicit
and implicit judicial pressure for children’s lawyers to side with state agencies,

217. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981) (“[N]either can we say that
the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding.”).
218. See Martin Guggenheim, The Importance of Family Defense, 48 FAM. L.Q. 597, 597
(2015) (referring to growth in the decade prior to the article’s publication).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., supra note 186 and accompanying text (describing the non-offending parent’s
argument in In re LaShonda B., 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1979)).
221. Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 4(b)(2)(G), 88 Stat. 4, 7. This provision is now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2012).
222. In particular, two influential symposia were held on the topic. Symposium, Special Issue
on Legal Representation of Children, 6 NEV. L.J. 571 (2006); Symposium, Conference on the
Ethical Issues in Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996).
223. Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805
(2006).
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and a broader family court culture all steer children’s lawyers to advocate for
state intervention.224
The record in Stanley and later non-offending parent cases support the
notion that children’s lawyers often serve state interests. The attorney appointed
to represent Peter Stanley’s two younger children did not object to state
intervention. After clarifying that he represented the children and not Stanley,225
the attorney questioned the state’s witness to confirm that she had no knowledge
of the Stanleys being married and to introduce Joan Stanley’s death
certificate.226 That is, the children’s lawyer helped the state make its case that
Stanley’s two younger children were dependent. In one-parent doctrine cases
discussed above in Part V.B, children’s lawyers similarly did not object to the
application of that doctrine.227
3. Family Court and Child Protection Agency Culture
Commentators have roundly criticized the culture of family courts,
especially in child protection cases. An insular group of repeat players—the
family court judges, lawyers, and case workers who practice regularly in family
court—is allowed to create an institutional culture where the professionals,
although dedicated to serving vulnerable children, are susceptible to group
think228 and make decisions based on heuristics—”cognitive short cuts.”229 As a
result, these repeat players tend to use coercive authority in a therapeutic guise to
pressure GALs, other attorneys, and parties to acquiesce to state-created plans to
break up families pending parental rehabilitation.230 Limited access to federal
court review231 has shielded family court culture from any significant
intervention.
Studies of case worker behaviors reveal many of the default attitudes and
actions that shape family courts’ treatment of non-offending fathers. Case
workers often “adopt an all-good or all-bad view of fathers,” and negative views

224. Id. at 805, 819–25.
225. See Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 7, May 6, 1969 at 8.
226. Id. at 16–17.
227. Cases cited supra, notes 173, 191–92, do not note objections from children’s lawyers to
the one-parent doctrine.
228. See Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional
Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 60–62 (2010) (explaining that group cultures with certain characteristics,
including those in family courts, are particularly susceptible to groupthink).
229. See Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cognitive
Biases, and Accountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 938–39 (2013) (finding that high caseloads
and time pressures in family court lead decision-makers to “employ a variety of effort-reducing,
time-saving heuristics”).
230. See Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child
Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 343–44 (1999).
231. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (describing limits on federal court
jurisdiction over child protection cases).
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can become self-fulfilling prophecies.232 Studies have documented how case
workers often “deactivate” fathers who do not live with mothers in case
management data systems, effectively sidelining them from case planning
involvement.233 Even after the Supreme Court decided Stanley, family courts
continued to manifest a “deeply embedded” culture of ignoring non-custodial
parents, especially fathers.234
When case workers arrive in family court, they often find a culture
suspicious of due process protections for parents; such suspicion was evident in
Stanley and remains so in modern doctrines. The ICPC and one-parent doctrines
are part of a family court culture in which judges, CPS agencies, and lawyers
(including many lawyers for parents and children) see themselves as engaged in
an exercise that helps children. Keeping a child in foster care without a finding
that the parent seeking custody is unfit is therefore seen as protective rather than
invasive. Decisions applying the Compact to parents reflect that culture,
asserting that the Compact should be “liberally” construed to serve children’s
interests—without questioning whether such application actually serves those
interests.235 Language from cases like In re LaShonda B. also reflect that culture,
describing the child protection case as about the child, not the parent, and
placing soft rhetorical edges on a decision ignoring the value of parents and
children living together.
This culture is evident in the trial transcripts of Stanley. Most importantly,
the state amended its petition to avoid having to put on any evidence that Peter
Stanley was an unfit father or that living in the state’s legal custody would serve
his children’s best interests. The state’s decision to avoid a focus on Mr.
Stanley’s fitness conformed with a family court culture that presumed foster care
would serve children’s interests regardless of parental fitness. Such trial tactics
continue to this day. In a recent one-parent doctrine case, Michigan authorities
chose to rely on the one-parent doctrine rather than prove a father unfit236—just
as Illinois authorities had relied on the absence of a marriage between Peter and
Joan Stanley rather than prove Peter Stanley unfit.237
Family court practitioners have documented the power of family court
culture. When non-offending parents, especially fathers, seek custody, the
default response has been: “We don’t do it that way in juvenile court.”238 A
practice guide describes it this way:
232. Christina A. Campbell, Douglas Howard, Brett S. Rayford & Derrick M. Gordon,
Fathers Matter: Involving and Engaging Fathers in the Child Welfare System Process, 53 CHILD.
& YOUTH SERVS. REV. 84, 85 (2015).
233. Id. at 87.
234. Harris, supra note 68, at 286.
235. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
236. In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Mich. 2014).
237. See supra Part II.A.
238. Cyrenthia D. Shaw, Creating a New Norm: Engaging Fathers Through Direct
Representation in Child in Need of Protection or Services Action, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143,
1157 (2014).
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[F]ew fathers who become involved [in their children’s case]
have a positive experience. Most say that they don’t understand
what is expected of them, and that the system makes them jump
through hoops to see their kids. They don’t understand why they
are looked at with suspicion or why placing their children with
complete strangers is better than letting their “kids come home”
with them. They become frustrated and angry with “the system,”
causing them and their children to lose out.239
The American Bar Association’s self-described “practical guidance” to
attorneys representing non-offending fathers240 explains that many courts will be
reluctant to grant custody to non-offending fathers and that “[s]ome judges may
even hold stereotypical views of gender roles.”241 First-hand accounts—often
more detailed than publicly available appellate records, which depend on
lawyers establishing facts at trial and filing appeals—depict deep-seated
aversions to letting children live with non-offending parents, especially
fathers.242 Unsurprisingly, studies of fathers involved in child protection systems
find that they feel that they are frequently “treated unfairly and with little
respect.”243
4. Academics’ and Policy-Makers’ Focus Away from Constitutional Fitness
In the period following the Stanley decision, leading academics and policymakers focused more on child protection policy reform and less on how
constitutional law might require family court reform.244 Although the academy
quickly opined on Stanley’s application to private family law disputes, it
remained largely silent regarding its application in foster care cases.245 As a
result, child protection law focused on policy questions, while the
constitutionality of agencies’ and courts’ treatment of non-offending parents
received scant attention.246
239. Howard A. Davidson, Foreword, in ADVOCATING FOR NONRESIDENT FATHERS IN CHILD
WELFARE COURT CASES vii (ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW ed. 2009).
240. Andrew S. Cohen, Representing Nonresident Fathers in Dependency Cases, in
ADVOCATING FOR NONRESIDENT FATHERS IN CHILD WELFARE COURT CASES, supra note 239, at 49,
52.
241. Id. at 60.
242. E.g., Ellen Kinney, Shaine’s Story: My Experience with Child Welfare and the Legal
System, in ADVOCATING FOR NONRESIDENT FATHERS IN CHILD WELFARE COURT CASES, supra note
239, at 66.
243. Christina A. Campbell, Douglas Howard, Brett S. Rayford & Derrick M. Gordon, supra
note 232, at 87.
244. Child protection law reform efforts thus differed from juvenile justice law reform, which
focused on the “constitutional domestication” of juvenile court. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
245. A student note provides a modest exception. It acknowledged that Stanley arose in the
foster care context and could even be limited to it. Schafrick, supra note 116, at 1608–09. That
comment did not explore the issues that might arise within the foster care context—such as the
one-parent doctrine.
246. Sankaran, supra note 94, at 58.
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Two influential scholarly works published soon after Stanley illustrate how
the case inexplicably escaped attention. Robert Mnookin’s 1975 article ChildCustody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy
advocated for determinate statutory standards for removing children.247 For
instance, he proposed that the state should have power to remove only those
children who faced an imminent danger and for whom no other reasonable
means of protection existed.248 In his article, Mnookin failed to cite Stanley and
made only passing reference to the Constitution. This omission was odd for
several reasons. First, Stanley was the only Supreme Court case that addressed a
parent’s right to custody in the face of state intervention.249 Second, Mnookin
feared that, under existing, indeterminate standards, state agencies might remove
children from their families, because they believed that another family would
serve children’s interests better.250 But Stanley directly rejected this argument by
requiring the state to prove the non-offending parent’s unfitness and not the
child’s best interests before a removal.251 Nonetheless, Mnookin’s article was
influential enough to warrant a retrospective symposium forty years later.252
Also in 1975, Michael Wald published State Intervention on Behalf of
“Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards.253 Wald cited Stanley
for the proposition that state intervention in families has constitutional limits.254
But he did not cite Stanley’s fitness standard and focused instead on current and
proposed statutory standards for state intervention.255 Again, Stanley escaped
deep analysis.
Reforms that followed these two influential works did so as a matter of
statutory law, 256 leaving the right to family integrity incompletely protected. For
example, some state legislation authorized removal only when a child faces an
immediate risk of harm,257 and federal legislation required states to make

247. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975).
248. Id. at 277–78.
249. Emily Buss, An Off-Label Use of Parental Rights? The Unanticipated Doctrinal
Antidote for Professor Mnookin’s Diagnosis, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (2014).
250. Mnookin, supra note 247, at 268–69.
251. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
252. Katharine T. Bartlett & Elizabeth S. Scott, Child-Custody Decisionmaking, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. i (2014).
253. Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
254. Id. at 989.
255. Id. at 1000–36.
256. Buss, supra note 249, at 13–14. The exception that proves the rule is In re Juvenile
Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1318–22 (Conn. 1983). Similar constitutional rules are suggested in a
small number of federal civil rights cases challenging state actors for allegedly unconstitutional
removals of children, some of which draw on due process law and cite Stanley. E.g., Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593–95 (2d Cir. 1999).
257. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2309(a). Mnookin proposed such a standard. Supra, note 247, at
278.
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“reasonable efforts” to prevent the need for removal.258 This legislative
codification allowed difficult questions to remain unanswered: If the state were
to remove a child from one parent, under what circumstances could the state
keep the child out of the other parent’s custody? If the other parent were an
unwed father, when would his right to custody (and the child’s right to live in his
custody) trump the state’s interest?
VI.
STANLEY’S RECENT RESURGENCE IN CHILD PROTECTION CASES
After more than four decades of being ignored in family court cases, Stanley
is enjoying a small resurgence. Although state agencies still often choose the
same troublesome litigation tactics that they used in Stanley—avoiding a hearing
on parental fitness through reliance on the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children or the one-parent doctrine—those practices face greater skepticism
by family courts today. The law remains inconsistent across the nation, but
recent progress has been significant on a state by state basis. That progress
stems, in no small part, from the vigorous parent representation that has grown in
recent years. It also results from legal, policy, and academic developments that
create a more receptive context for Stanley-based arguments.
A. Concerning Practices Continue
1. Litigation Practices and Court Rulings akin to Stanley
The facts in Stanley reflect significant ambiguity in the record. Though
Stanley won in the Supreme Court, he was previously found to have neglected
his oldest child, and the state may have had legitimate concerns about his ability
to raise his youngest children, whose custody was at issue in Stanley.259 The
state of Illinois’ litigation choices avoided a prompt and clear decision regarding
Stanley’s fitness, electing instead to seek custody of Stanley’s two younger
children based on Stanley’s marital status. This litigation choice ensured that the
state’s case would not serve the children’s interests. Either Stanley was, in fact,
fit and the state harmed the children through an unnecessary separation from
their father, or he was not fit and the state’s refusal to litigate his fitness imposed
years of uncertainty followed by an ultimate failure to protect the children.
Stanley suggests that such litigation choices are impermissible.260 State
agencies would have to litigate the fitness of parents who sought custody of their
258. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i) (2015).
259. To be clear, I do not take a position on this issue. Because the state chose to litigate
Stanley’s marital status rather than his fitness, no definitive public determination of Stanley’s
fitness exists.
260. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (“We have concluded that all Illinois
parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed
from their custody. It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while
granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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children, thus avoiding the harms that Illinois’ litigation choice imposed on
Stanley’s children. Yet, using the one-parent doctrine and the Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children, states have avoided adjudicating parents’ fitness
and thus have been replicating the harm imposed on Stanley. The litigation of a
recent Michigan case, In re Sanders, illustrates how these practices have
continued in other states.261 State authorities in In re Sanders sought custody of
two children, alleging that both their mother, Tammy Sanders, and their father,
Lance Laird, had neglected them. Sanders pleaded no contest to the allegations
against her, but Laird insisted on a trial on the allegations against him. Rather
than prove its allegations at a trial, the state dismissed its case against Laird and
convinced the court at a post-disposition motions hearing to keep the children in
a kinship placement with their aunt without ever obtaining an adjudication that
Laird was unfit.262 Just as Illinois had legitimate concerns about Peter Stanley’s
parenting, Michigan had reasons to question Laird’s fitness as a parent.263 As in
Stanley, the state avoided litigating its concerns, preventing a trial’s rigorous
testing of the evidence against Laird—either unnecessarily placing the children
with an aunt, or unnecessarily extending litigation and putting the children at risk
of reunification with an unfit parent. The Michigan Supreme Court declared the
one-parent doctrine—on which the state’s litigation strategy depended—
unconstitutional in In re Sanders in 2014.264 Unfortunately, the case’s litigation
history illustrates an ongoing problem. Similarly, in the Grant case discussed in
Part III.A, the state never alleged that Mr. Grant was unfit to raise his son,
Andrew. It simply sought (and, temporarily, won) custody of Andrew without
addressing Mr. Grant’s fitness.
Another recent case from Kansas illustrates how judges—even over all
parties’ objections—sometimes fail to give non-offending parents appropriate
respect. In In re A.G., the trial court determined that a 16-year-old should be
removed from his father.265 The GAL and the child’s mother requested that the

261. In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Mich. 2014). Sanders also illustrates Stanley’s
rediscovery. See infra Part VI.B.
262. Sanders, 852 N.W.2d at 527–28.
263. Laird tested positive for cocaine use, was on probation for a domestic violence
conviction, had violated a court order to keep the neglectful mother away from the children, and
had been arrested for selling cocaine. Id. at 553 (Markman, J., dissenting). At the time of the
appellate decision, he was incarcerated after having been convicted of conspiracy to distribute
more than five hundred grams of cocaine. Id. at 553 n.23.
264. See infra Part VI.B.
265. In re A.G., No. 114,297, slip. op. at 1 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/Opinions/Unpublished/Ctapp/2016/20160422/1142
97.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL22-RY5V]. For media coverage of this case, see Justin Wingerter,
Court of Appeals: Shawnee County Too Quick to Place Children in State Custody: ‘Long-Standing
Rule’ of Declaring Emergency When None Exists, TOPEKA CAP.-J., (Apr. 25, 2016),
http://cjonline.com/news/2016-04-26/court-appeals-shawnee-county-too-quick-place-children-state
custody?utm_source=WhatCountsEmail&utm_medium=CJOnline%20Morning%20Headlines&ut
m_campaign=Morning%20News%3Chttp://lists.icfwebservices.com/t/189963/2031941/15895/32/
# [https://perma.cc/8XTX-LVBH].
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child live with her, because no allegations had been made against her. Yet,
echoing the poverty-based concerns in In re LaShonda B., the trial court ordered
the child into foster care, because the child’s mother lived temporarily in a house
rented by someone else while the family was “saving money to move into an
apartment of their own.”266 Absent a study of the individuals that the mother was
living with at the time, the court refused to award her custody of the child.267
While the appellate court eventually reversed this decision, several elements of
the litigation are telling. First, the local trial court had “a long standing rule”
preventing parents from maintaining custody when they lived with friends—
regardless of any evidence regarding fitness.268 Second, the appellate court’s
holding remains limited. It held that there was no emergency justifying an
immediate, pre-adjudication removal or justifying a failure to make reasonable
efforts to prevent removal.269 But what if reasonable efforts had been made and
no alternative housing was available? The court did not rule that poverty or
temporary housing was irrelevant to parental fitness and thus could not be used
to deny a non-offending parent custody.
2. Inadequate Social Worker Engagement with Non-Custodial Fathers
Federal government reviews reveal widespread failure by child protection
agencies to involve, and in many cases even contact, non-custodial fathers.
Under federal funding statutes, the Department of Health and Human Services
conducts regular Child and Family Services reviews of state agencies and
analyzes their performance on a set of performance benchmarks.270 The most
recent aggregate report for these reviews identifies significantly weaker efforts
by CPS agencies regarding fathers than mothers. For instance, federal authorities
found that state and local agencies made “concerted efforts” to support a
“positive and nurturing relationship” between foster children and their mothers
in 68 percent of cases but achieved similar success in only 52 percent of cases
involving fathers.271 These figures exclude cases in which the agency believed
that a relationship with parents was contrary to a child’s best interests.272 That
suggests that this disparity exists even accounting for absentee or abusive fathers
with whom child protection agencies would be less eager to work. The federal
agency also found forty-nine states out of compliance regarding caseworker

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

In re A.G., No. 114,297, slip op. at 2 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2016).
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.32–34 (2012).
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FED.
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. REVIEWS: AGGREGATE REPORT, ROUND 2, FISCAL YEARS 2007–2010 27
(2011).
272. Id. at 26.
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visits with fathers, as compared with forty states regarding caseworkers visits
with mothers.273
These gender disparities were particularly pronounced for fathers of Black
and Latino children.274 That racial disparity exists despite research suggesting
that Black fathers’ involvement with their children, even when their romantic
relationship with their children’s mother has ended, is at least on par with that of
White fathers and may be greater compared to Latino fathers.275
Some earlier efforts by state agencies working to identify parents illustrated
how agencies’ view foster children’s fathers as obstacles to adoption, rather than
as parents who could help their children. For example, South Carolina’s
initiation of a diligent search program in the 1990s focused “on identifying and
locating fathers primarily for the purposes of expediting the termination of
parental rights, to hasten adoption proceedings.”276 Other efforts focused on
increasing child support collections but not non-monetary paternal
involvement.277
3. Viewing Non-Offending Parents as Saviors
In re M.L.278 remains good law in Pennsylvania. Its approach—to transfer
custody to the non-offending parent and close the case, even if the custodial
parent never gets a day in court to challenge the allegations against him or her—
has been endorsed by a collection of state agencies279 that seek to update the

273. Id. at 31; see also id. at 65 (“Cases were more likely to be rated a Strength for items
relating to the provision of services for mothers than for fathers.”).
274. Id. at 67.
275. See, e.g., Calvina Z. Ellerbe, Jerrett B. Jones & Marcia J. Carlson, Nonresident Fathers’
Involvement after a Nonmarital Birth: Exploring Differences by Race/Ethnicity 19–20 (BendheimThoman Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. WP14-07-FF, 2014), http://
crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP14-07-FF.pdf [https://perma.cc/4P38-XVFU] (summarizing
prior studies and offering confirming new studies). The population studied here—fathers who were
never married to and do not live with the mothers of their children—is broader than the population
of families whose children are placed in foster care. Some factor—not yet evident in the
research—must explain why unwed and nonresident Black fathers would be generally more
involved with their children yet less involved when their children are brought into foster care. One
hypothesis is that the sub-group of fathers whose children are brought into foster care have many
more obstacles to involvement and that agencies treat unwed Black fathers differently than unwed
White fathers. One study of a small group of foster children suggested that most Black fathers of
children in foster care had some contact with their children and saw being a “good father” as a key
element of their identity. Pate, supra note 69, at 644.
276. WHAT ABOUT THE DADS?, supra note 70, at 4.
277. Id. at 4–5. A federal review found one exception to this trend—an Illinois program
focused on identifying non-custodial fathers as placement options for foster children. Id.
278. See supra Part III.C.
279. The Compact calls on each member state to identify a “compact administrator” who, in
conjunction with other states’ compact administrators, can promulgate rules and regulations for
administering the compact. See, e.g., Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), art.
VII (codified at D.C. CODE § 4-1422(2011)). That collection of compact administrators is known
as the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.
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Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. The group has proposed a new
compact that more explicitly addresses its application to parents. The new
compact would codify the 1976 opinion applying the Compact to parents280 and
a procedure akin to In re M.L. The new compact would also provide that it does
not apply if a non-custodial parent—defined as one not accused of abuse or
neglect—has a substantial relationship with the child, as long as the family court
finds living with that parent serves the child’s best interests and terminates
jurisdiction over the case.281 Thus, under the new ICPC, a non-offending parent
could come forward and request custody, and the court and child protection
agency could wipe its hands of the case by giving him or her custody and closing
the case—depriving the custodial parent of a hearing on the allegations against
him or her, similar to the result of the court’s decision in In re M.L.
The new ICPC is not in effect. By its own terms it can take effect only when
thirty-five states adopt it.282 As of 2016, only eleven states have adopted it.283
While those states have thus decided to continue ignoring Stanley, a majority of
states have effectively rejected the new ICPC. That rejection might indicate a
renewed application of Stanley’s core holding in child protection cases, the topic
of the next section.
B. Stanley’s Resurgence
Stanley may be experiencing a much delayed resurgence in the child
protection and state intervention context from which it arose, but in which it has
been dormant for many years. Most dramatically, the Michigan Supreme Court
declared the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional in the summer of 2014 in In re
Sanders, relying heavily on Stanley.284 In its opinion, the court cited Stanley
AAICPC, Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,
http://www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/en/home.html [https://perma.cc/22SB-95YN].
280. The original Compact provided that “[n]o sending state shall send, bring, or cause to be
sent or brought into any other party state a child for placement in foster care or prior to a possible
adoption.” ICPC, D.C. Code § 4-1422, art. III(a) (codified at D.C. CODE § 4-1422) (1989). The
new Compact would more broadly refer to the “interstate placement of a child subject to ongoing
court jurisdiction in the sending state.” New Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, art.
III(A)(1) (2009), http://www.aphsa.org/content/dam/AAICPC/PDF%20DOC/PROPOSED _LEG
ISLATIVE_LANGUAGE.pdf [https://perma.cc/52N9-P7RV]. See also Vivek S. Sankaran,
Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children: A Critical Analysis of Efforts to Reform the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 435, 454 (2006) (“The proposed
Compact also continues to treat most biological parents as legal strangers to the child.”).
281. New Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, art. III(B)(5) (2009),
http://www.aphsa.org/content/dam/AAICPC/PDF%20DOC/PROPOSED_LEGISLATIVE_LANG
UAGE.pdf [https://perma.cc/52N9-P7RV].
282. Id. at art. XIV(B).
283. A map created by the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children shows Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin as the only states that have adopted the new ICPC.
New ICPC Enactment Progress, ASS’N ADMINS. INTERSTATE COMPACT ON PLACEMENT CHILD.,
http://www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/en/NewICPC.html [https://perma.cc/X5R3-XN2E].
284. In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 539 (Mich. 2014).
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twenty-two times, including two block quotes. The dissent also acknowledged
that Stanley required some type of hearing on the non-offending father’s
fitness.285
In re Sanders followed several other recent cases that cast doubt on the oneparent doctrine and the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children’s
application to non-offending parents. The Nevada Supreme Court held in 2013
that “keeping the child from the custody of the parent who is not the subject of
the dependency proceeding violates the parent’s fundamental constitutional
rights to parent his child, when the child was not removed from the home
because of his conduct . . . .”286 Although it did not discuss Stanley, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals held in 2014 that “the right to presumptive
custody of a fit, unwed, non-custodial father who has grasped the opportunity to
be involved in his child’s life can be overridden only by a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to be placed with
someone else.”287 A similar trend may be evident in the most recent Interstate
Compact cases, which have ruled against its application to parents,288 and in a
post-Sanders Illinois Supreme Court opinion, citing constitutional grounds for
reversing an order placing children in foster care despite their non-offending
mother’s fitness.289
C. Explaining Stanley’s Emergent Resurgence—and Ongoing Challenges
Several factors help explain why family courts are rediscovering Stanley
now. First, the parents’ bar is significantly stronger today than in the 1970s and
1980s. Second, the children’s bar has grown more complicated, with many
children’s lawyers and law offices opposing historical treatment of nonoffending parents. Two other developments distinguish the present policy
context from that which immediately followed Stanley: a greater academic and
policy attention to the role of fathers generally and unwed fathers in particular,
including a focus on how unwed fathers can be a positive force in their
children’s lives, and a greater attention to the harms of foster care.

285. Id. at 554 (Markman, J., dissenting).
286. In re A.G., 295 P.3d 589, 590 (Nev. 2013). The Nevada Supreme Court cited Stanley
three times but did not discuss it in detail like the Sanders court did. Id. at 593, 595.
287. In re D.S., 88 A.3d 678, 681 (D.C. 2014).
288. See, e.g., In re C.R.-A.A., No. 04-16-00782-CV, 2017 WL 2260115, at *5–11 (Tex.
App. May 24, 2017); In re Courtney R., No. M2015-01024-COA-R3-JV, 2017 WL 1548241, at
*5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2017); In re S.R.C.-Q., 367 P.3d 1276, 1279–82 (Kan. Ct. App.
2016); In re Emoni W., 48 A.3d 1, 6 (Conn. 2012); In re D.F.-M., 236 P.3d 961, 962 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2010); In re A.X.W., Docket No. 299622, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 983 (Ct. App. May 26,
2011); In re Alexis O., 959 A.2d 176, 185 (N.H. 2008).
289. People v. Heather M. (In re M.M.), 2016 IL 119932, ¶¶ 26–27 (2016).
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1. Expanded and Strengthened Parents’ Bar—with Significant Room for
Improvement
This Article focuses on the strong development of the parents’ bar—the
group of lawyers who specialize in representing parents in child protection
cases—which has come into its own through “a growing national movement” in
recent years.290 The ABA has established the National Parent Representation
Steering Committee and, in 2009, began hosting national parents’ attorney
conferences.291 States have funded pilot programs devoted to high-quality parent
defense and found positive results.292 There are, quite simply, more and better
lawyers representing all parents in child protection cases around the country, and
they are more likely to request application of fundamental precedents like
Stanley.
The organized parents’ bar has paid particular attention to legal and
advocacy issues related to representing non-offending parents, especially nonoffending fathers. The ABA Center on Children and the Law published a guide
to representing non-offending fathers in 2009,293 and a 2015 guide to
representing parents includes a section on “non-adjudicated parents.”294
Despite progress compared to the 1970s, states do not provide
representation for non-offending parents across the board. The Supreme Court
has held that the Constitution does not require a right to counsel in every
parental status termination proceeding.295 Several states have right to counsel
statutes that explicitly limit right to counsel to parents from whom child
protection authorities seek to remove children or parents against whom child
protection authorities file accusations of abuse or neglect.296 The practice in
290. Guggenheim, supra note 218, at 597.
291. ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, National Project to Improve Representation for
Parents Involved in the Child Welfare System, http://www.americanbar. org/content/
dam/aba/publications/center_on_children_and_the_law/parentrepresentation/project_description.a
uthcheckdam.doc [https://perma.cc/AL53-G9T7].
292. Steve M. Wood, Alicia Summers & Crystal Soderman Duarte, Legal Representation in
the Juvenile Dependency System: Travis County, Texas’ Parent Representation Pilot Project, 54
FAM. CT. REV. 277 (2016); Mark E. Courtney & Jennifer L. Hook, Evaluation of the Impact of
Enhanced Parental Legal Representation on the Timing of Permanency Outcomes for Children in
Foster Care, 34 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERV’S REV. 1337, 1343 (2012). For a less rigorous study, see
NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, Research Report: Exploring Outcomes
Related to Legal Representation for Parents Involved in Mississippi’s Juvenile Dependency System
(2014), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/MS%20Parent%20Representation%20Follow-up%
20Report%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/3TK7-YAXN].
293. ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW & NATIONAL QUALITY IMPROVEMENT CTR. ON NONRESIDENT FATHERS AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, Advocating for Nonresident Fathers in
Child Welfare Court Cases (2009).
294. Good-Dworak & Johnson, supra note 75, at 204–08.
295. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
296. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(h)(1)(A)–(B) (2015) (providing all parents with a right
to counsel but limiting the right to appointed counsel to “the parent or custodian from whom
custody was removed”); KY. REV. STAT. § 620.100(1)(b) (2014) (requiring the court to appoint
“counsel for the parent who exercises custodial control or supervision,” but not requiring this for
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some other jurisdictions may functionally deprive non-offending or noncustodial parents from representation; the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services studied four states’ efforts to involve non-resident fathers in 2006 and
reported that two did not provide representation to these parents.297
Such statutes and practices can leave non-offending parents without counsel
to advocate for them—just as the Cook County juvenile court proceeded to trial
despite Peter Stanley’s request, “Gee, I would like to acquire an attorney.”298
The result is that such parents lack attorneys to help them establish paternity, file
for custody, or challenge dispositional orders that deprive them of custody or
visitation.299 And even when attorneys are present, they sometimes fail to
challenge such practices; some parents who have sought to challenge the oneparent doctrine on appeal lost due to attorneys’ failure to preserve objections in
the trial court.300
2. A Children’s Bar Friendlier to Stanley and Parental Rights
Commentators have long criticized children’s lawyers for overly supporting
state intervention in families, rather than providing a check on such
intervention,301 and specifically for ignoring fathers in many cases.302 But the
child protection field’s increased focus on the value of family integrity and foster
care’s harms now extends to many children’s advocates, who have joined the
fight on the side of limiting state intervention, both generally and in specific
reference to one-parent doctrine and Interstate Compact cases. The GAL in the
Grant case, described in Part III.A, took a leading role in advocating for the child
to live with his father. The GAL in the recent Kansas case, In re A.G., appealed

parents who do not exercise custodial control or supervision); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.420(1)
(2013) (providing a right to counsel for a “parent . . . of a child who is alleged to have abused or
neglected the child,” but not a parent not so alleged); N.H. REV. STAT. § 169-C:10(II)(a) (2010)
(providing that “the court shall appoint an attorney to represent an indigent parent alleged to have
neglected or abused his or her child” and that “the court may appoint an attorney to represent an
indigent parent not alleged to have neglected or abused his or her child if the parent is a household
member and such independent legal representation is necessary to protect the parent’s interests”)
(emphasis added).
297. WHAT ABOUT THE DADS?, supra note 70, at 29.
298. Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 7, May 6, 1969, at 8.
299. Shaw, supra note 238, at 1144. For an example of a one-parent doctrine case in which
the non-offending parent lacked counsel, at least initially, see In re Bill F., 761 A.2d 470, 472
(N.H. 2000).
300. E.g., In re A.R., 330 S.W.3d 858, 864–65 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); In re Mays, 807 N.W.2d
307, 307–308, 308 n.1 (Mich. 2012).
301. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 223, at 806.
302. Andrew Zinn & Clark Peters, Expressed-Interest Legal Representation for Children in
Substitute Care: Evaluation of the Impact of Representation on Children’s Permanency Outcomes,
53 FAM. CT. REV. 589, 594 (2015) (reporting criticisms of a Florida county’s child representation
program as “favor[ing] adoption over reunification” and “seriously neglect[ing]” fathers and
paternal relatives).
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the trial court’s refusal to release the child to his non-offending mother.303
Children’s organizations have joined amicus efforts against the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children and the one-parent doctrine304—efforts
that did not exist in years immediately following Stanley.
3. Academic Attention
In the immediate aftermath of Stanley, academic attention to child
protection law largely ignored issues involving non-offending parents, especially
fathers.305 Three decades later, that largely remained the case. One scholar noted
in 2005 that “[s]light attention has been paid to the issue [of fathers in the child
welfare system] in the academic and general literatures,”306 and a federal review
in 2006 found a “dearth of research specific to the topic of nonresident father
involvement in the child welfare system.”307 That failure has begun to change in
the last decade.
First, the doctrines at issue—and their problems under Stanley—have
received belated academic attention. Vivek Sankaran has written about Stanley
violations,308 litigated relevant cases (he represented the father in Sanders), and
published policy papers on related topics.309 Leslie Joan Harris and others have
written law review articles on the topic, cited throughout this piece.310 More
broadly, academics have recently begun to consider a wider set of constitutional
protections for family integrity. While scholars in the 1970s recommended that
states make efforts to keep families intact as a policy matter, for instance, a
leading scholar recently argued that the Constitution might require such
efforts.311 Another leading scholar has concluded that “the future of marital
supremacy”—including the privileged treatment of married parents compared to

303. In re A.G., No. 114, 297, slip op. at 4 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/Opinions/Unpublished/Ctapp/2016/20160422/114
297.pdf [https://perma.cc/V573-LRB9].
304. The National Association of Counsel for Children, for instance, has filed amicus briefs
in both categories of cases. NACC, Amicus Curiae Activity, http://www.naccchildlaw.org/
news/default.asp?id=1335 [https://perma.cc/D8B2-PJ5J] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (noting amicus
briefs in In re Emoni W. and In re Mays). The author serves on the NACC’s amicus curiae
committee and wrote the NACC’s amicus brief in Emoni W. regarding the ICPC.
305. See supra Part V.C.4.
306. Pate, supra note 69, at 635.
307. WHAT ABOUT THE DADS?, supra note 70, at 4.
308. Sankaran, supra note 94, at 58; Sankaran, supra note 156.
309. E.g., VIVEK S. SANKARAN, FOSTER KIDS IN LIMBO: THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN ON THE PERMANENCY OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
(2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/pcl/Documents/Final%20Summary%20to
%20Casey.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6F6-5BA8].
310. Harris, supra note 68; Greene, supra note 94.
311. Buss, supra note 249. Buss wrote in a symposium that focused on Mnookin’s 1975
article discussed in Part V.C.4.
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unmarried parents and especially unmarried fathers—”is among the most
pressing outstanding constitutional questions.”312
Moreover, scholars and policy advocates have examined the role of nonoffending parents in more depth. A wider set of research by federal agencies in
the first decade of the 2000s also signaled a new openness to examining the issue
and taking initial steps to change practice. Research also failed to show any
association between involving non-resident fathers and negative outcomes that
some might fear from such involvement—such as safety dangers (if certain
fathers are abusive) or delays in finalizing adoptions or guardianships (if fathers
raise objections late in a case). When children reunified, researchers found no
difference in the rate of subsequent maltreatment allegations when CPS officials
contacted fathers about their children’s cases.313 Comparing cases in which a
father was identified but not contacted by CPS officials with cases in which CPS
officials did contact fathers, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
concluded that “contacting fathers does not appear to slow case proceedings or
complicate the case in a way that delays permanency for the child.”314 If
anything, involving fathers was associated with more positive outcomes315—
faster case closing due to both reunification and to adoption.316 The federal
government established a “Quality Improvement Center on Non-Resident
Fathers,” which identified the “will and commitment of the [child protection
agency] staff” as an essential barrier to involving fathers and set a goal of
“changing a culture to value and seek out a father’s involvement.”317
Much of the federally funded research and other advocacy in the early 2000s
still did not fully address the complicated issues raised by non-offending parent
involvement. Research has measured simple quantifiable topics like whether
CPS workers contacted identified biological fathers of foster children on their
case loads.318 That bar is low, and the large number of cases in which CPS
workers did not make such contacts provides a sobering reminder of the deep
problems that remain.319 This research did not broach the more difficult topics of
when and how to involve non-custodial fathers, what evidence would justify not
involving them, and how to balance a previously non-custodial father’s request
for custody with the previously custodial mother’s wishes for reunification.
312. Mayeri, supra note 147, at 2388.
313. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MORE ABOUT THE DADS: EXPLORING
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN NONRESIDENT FATHER INVOLVEMENT AND CHILD WELFARE CASE
OUTCOMES 18 (2008).
314. Id. at 12.
315. Id. at 21. As the phrase “associated with” suggests, the data reveals correlation but
cannot prove causation.
316. Id. at 11.
317. QIC 9 Steps, AM. HUMANE ASS’N (on file with author).
318. WHAT ABOUT THE DADS?, supra note 70, at ix.
319. In a study documenting the efforts of child welfare agencies in four states to contact the
fathers of children in foster care, agency staff had attempted to contact “nonresident fathers” in
only 55% of cases. Id.
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Federal reports, for instance, noted that “[w]hen a nonresident father is
considered appropriate to care for his child, perhaps with the aid of available
services, the agency may place a child with him.”320 This statement gives no
indication that the standard for parental custody is usually fitness rather than
“appropriate[ness]” or that in some cases an agency must (rather than “may”)
permit a father and child to live together. Federal reports also note that many
non-custodial fathers appeared to have various problems—many had some
criminal justice system involvement, substance abuse conditions, or other “issues
preventing placement,” in the federal government’s terminology. 321 But under
Stanley the question is not whether a parent has “issues” but whether those issues
render the parent unfit.
Despite these flaws, research on the child welfare system helps explain the
renewed scholarly focus on the relationships of non-custodial parents, especially
fathers, with their children. The Fragile Families data set has led scholars to
document a wide range of non-custodial father involvement.322 It concludes that
fathers maintain “high” levels of involvement with former partners pregnant with
their children, and most set a goal of continued involvement through the child’s
life.323 Finding a rich body of evidence that non-custodial fathers have strong
connections with their children, anthropologists Peter Gray and Kermyt
Anderson have proposed recognizing such relationships as an essential marker of
humanity: “One definition we have never seen proposed for humanity, but which
seems to be applicable is this: humans are the species in which males continue to
invest in offspring after the parents cease to be in a sexual relationship.”324
Noting the value of keeping fathers engaged with their children, Laurie Kohn
proposes various legal reforms in the private child support and custody systems
to avoid possible “adverse consequences on paternal engagement” from the
current legal structure.325
4. Increased Focus on Foster Care’s Harms
The strengthened parents’ bar may find more receptive audiences as child
protection professionals focus again on limiting the state’s ability to remove
children. Recent studies have compared maltreated children removed from their
families and placed in foster care with similarly maltreated kids left with their
320. Id. at 39.
321. Id. at x.
322. See Ellerbe, supra note 275.
323. Sara McLanahan & Audrey N. Beck, Parental Relationships in Fragile Families, 20
FUTURE CHILD. 17, 20 (2010). A majority of non-resident fathers see their children at least monthly
in the first year of their child’s life. Such involvement declines as children age, but remains for a
majority of non-resident fathers for the first five years of their children’s lives. Such involvement
also includes formal and informal child support for a large portion—though not a majority—of
non-resident fathers. Id. at 22.
324. PETER B. GRAY & KERMYT G. ANDERSON, FATHERHOOD: EVOLUTION AND HUMAN
PATERNAL BEHAVIOR 129–30 (2010) (emphasis in original).
325. Kohn, supra note 105, at 515.
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families; the latter did better on a host of long-term outcomes.326 Leading policy
advocates and policy trends also reflect a focus on using foster care as a last
resort. Casey Family Programs—a leading foundation providing services and
funding to a range of child welfare-related activities—has set a goal of “safely
reduc[ing] the need for foster care [by] 50 percent by the year 2020.”327 When
Congress authorized the Department of Health and Human Services to offer
limited waivers of federal funding rules to permit greater flexibility, fifteen states
sought waivers to prevent foster care entries.328
In this context, removals by child protection authorities have decreased 14
percent—from 307,000 in 2005 to 265,000 in 2014, although the most recent
figures suggest an uptick.329 That downward trend might reflect an increasing
concern for the harms of removal—which might translate to closer consideration
of questions raised by Stanley.
This trend may have a particular effect in the child protection system’s
treatment of fathers, because efforts to provide a plausible alternative to a foster
care placement may find a more receptive audience now than in the years
following Stanley. The increasing numbers of single fathers raising children330
might lessen some suspicion of non-offending fathers who seek custody of their
children. Some observers have identified an “emerging paradigm shift
concerning rethinking the role of fathers in the child welfare process.”331
Informed by positive outcomes for children associated with fathers’
involvement, some agencies have increased efforts to engage fathers more in
child protection cases. Even if these efforts do not always involve rethinking the
326. Joseph J. Doyle, Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster
Care, 97 AMER. ECON REV. 1583, 1607 (2007) (finding children removed from their families have
“higher delinquency rates, along with some evidence of higher teen birth rates and lower earnings”
than similar children left at home); Joseph J. Doyle, Child Protection and Adult Crime: Using
Investigator Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of Foster Care, 116 J. POL. ECON. 746, 748
(2008) (“The results suggest that among children on the margin of placement, children placed in
foster care have arrest, conviction, and imprisonment rates as adults that are three times higher
than those of children who remained at home.”).
327. About Casey Family Programs, CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS, http://www.casey.org/about
[https://perma.cc/3F24-S6Z6].
328. JAMES BELL ASSOCIATES, SUMMARY OF THE TITLE IV-E CHILD WELFARE WAIVER
DEMONSTRATIONS (2015), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cw_waiver_summary
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH4Z-WYAP].
329. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, TRENDS IN
FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION: FFY 2002-FFY 2013, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
cb/trends_fostercare_adoption2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E72-3AQ3]. Over the past decade, the
number of removals hit their lowest point—252,000 in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, before
increasing to 255,000 in 2013, and 265,000 in 2014. Whether that recent increase reflects a shift
towards more removals generally, or a more immediate response to the heroin epidemic or other
factors remains hard to discern.
330. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE RISE OF SINGLE FATHERS: A NINEFOLD INCREASE SINCE
1960 (2013).
331. Christina A. Campbell, Douglas Howard, Brett S. Rayford & Derrick M. Gordon, supra
note 232, at 85.
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doctrines discussed in this Article, it may make family court culture somewhat
less resistant to efforts to change those doctrines.
VII.
CONCLUSION
Nearly forty-five years after the Supreme Court’s first unwed parent case,
child protection law still requires reform to comport with that holding. The oneparent doctrine and the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
continue to separate thousands of children from non-offending parents, mostly
fathers, and require those children to live in foster care. On the other end of the
spectrum, accused parents frequently lose custody of their children when nonoffending parents come forward—even without the accused parents getting their
day in court.
Fortunately, child protection law appears to be adapting to the new realities.
State courts and academics have increasingly developed nuanced approaches to
these issues. In particular, courts appear increasingly likely to begin their
analysis with the appropriate starting point—the constitutional rights of both
parents, especially their right to custody unless the state can prove them unfit. If
state officials have legitimate concerns about a parent—as they may have had
regarding Peter Stanley and as they may have in modern cases such as In re
Sanders—they should plead that and prove them.
Understanding these issues—both how problematic doctrines were
developed and how reforms have occurred—requires an understanding of the
curious course taken by the Supreme Court’s path-breaking decision in Stanley
v. Illinois. That case centered on child protection law but, until recently, courts
have largely not applied it in child protection cases. Exploring how Stanley has
(and has not) been applied over the past four decades is a case study in law
reform in a field that has been the subject of frequent reform efforts. Contrasting
the period in which Stanley was ignored, and in which problematic doctrines
developed, with more recent years highlights important elements of the system
that can provide a stronger context for law reform.
First, advocacy for all parties is essential. Peter Stanley won because he had
a lawyer who stood up to the prevailing family court culture and challenged a
long-standing practice. And Stanley has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years due
in large part to improved advocacy by parents’ attorneys. The parent
representation movement should continue to grow and press these (and many
other) important legal claims in courts and legislatures.
Second, aspects of family court culture perpetuate bad practices. This
recognition underscores how lawyers for parents and children fighting against
state intervention must have the willingness and ability to challenge longstanding but troublesome practices. It also affirms the importance of imposing
basic due process rules to provide a check on a system that would otherwise
make frequent mistakes.
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Third, the actions of policy and academic elites can make a difference.
Ignoring the role of the Constitution in child protection reform in the years
immediately following Stanley, and ignoring the issue of non-offending and noncustodial parents in the child protection system, enabled doctrines to develop
that instead relied on bad policy. Much of this area relates to political power—
the power of the private adoption lobby demanded immediate responses in the
1970s, shifting the common understanding of Stanley from its origins as a child
protection case to a private adoption case. Increasing academic and policy
attention on these issues has helped foster the recent steps towards reform.
Scholars and researchers can counteract the political power dynamic by focusing
attention on important legal and policy questions, which may otherwise be left
unexamined.
Stanley remains the constitutional foundation of the modern child protection
system. With renewed interest in this system’s reform, Stanley can continue to
play the role it should have played four decades ago in shaping child protection
law’s response to recurring and difficult issues.

